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CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SHARING: A LEGAL
PRIMER FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PRACTITIONERS IN
CALIFORNIA
W. David Ball* & Robert Weisberg*
ABSTRACT
California criminal justice agencies need access to data in order to
provide security, health care treatment, and appropriate programming, as
well as to coordinate these activities with other agencies. By the same
token, outside agencies—whether criminal, social service, or nongovernmental—could often do their jobs more effectively with access to
information generated or retained within particular criminal justice
agencies. Criminal justice realignment under AB 109 has only heightened
the need for inter-agency data sharing and cooperation, yet there continue
to be misunderstandings about the legal framework surrounding
information exchange.
This Article aims to provide a basic, practical background on the legal
rules relevant to information exchange, highlighting under what
circumstances—and with whom—criminal justice agencies may share, must
share, or must not share their information. The Article’s basic conclusion
is that criminal justice data sharing is enabled by the existing legal regime.
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INTRODUCTION
California criminal justice agencies need access to data in order to
provide security, health care treatment, and appropriate programming, as
well as to coordinate these activities with other agencies. By the same
token, outside agencies—whether criminal, social service, or nongovernmental—could often do their jobs more effectively with access to
information generated or retained within particular criminal justice
agencies. For example, knowing that an arrestee is mentally ill could assist
a jail with his classification, housing, and medical care; similarly, knowing
the risk status of a released prisoner could help local community
supervision prepare for support services and supervision. Coordination of
information exchange involves a number of technical and organizational
challenges, but there is also considerable uncertainty about governing law.
So, while the need for information is great, in the absence of legal guidance,
some agencies are understandably reluctant to share information. They are
unsure about whether it will expose them to civil liability under statutes
protecting confidentiality or other legal rules. In regard to the many varied
categories of individual information they handle, agency officials often ask:
When am I forbidden to disclose information? When am I allowed to
disclose information (and to whom)? When am I required to disclose
information (and to whom)?
This Article is designed to address and alleviate these concerns, to
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help state and local officials understand the most important and widely
applicable legal doctrines that determine their responsibilities in handling
information developed or collected in the many stages of criminal justice.
Readers should, however, note that this Primer is only a starting point: its
goal is to provide a broadly accurate overview of the issues, not to give
legal advice for specific governmental decisions. Therefore, we urge
readers to consult with an attorney before adopting any specific new
policies on information sharing or making specific decisions about
information-sharing in any sensitive matter.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A review of the legal doctrines governing information-sharing in
criminal justice leads to one overall conclusion: California law contains a
strong mandate for robust information-sharing among agencies involved in
any substantial way with criminal justice, and criminal justice informationsharing faces few legal barriers—surely far fewer than many officials tend
to believe as a matter of common intuition or perception. So long as
agencies exercise care in the security and confidentiality of the information
they exchange, they will, in general, not be exposed to statutory or civil
liability for information transfers that serve reasonable institutional
purposes.
One should read the entire Primer to get a sense of this legal area as a
whole, but the Primer has also been divided into topic headings for easy
reference. The following key summary points reflect the organization of the
Primer:

1. Sharing summary information among criminal justice agencies is a
“safe harbor.” Agencies should feel comfortable sharing this
information with other criminal justice agencies, provided the
sharing is done with appropriate safeguards. These safeguards
already govern the use of criminal justice data. That is, changes
wrought by either technology or realignment do not change the
rules. As long as agencies continue to follow the rules with which
they are (or should be) already familiar, there is nothing new—and
uncertain—about exchanging such information electronically or
under the rubric of realignment. Statutes and agency regulations
govern who can properly use data in the California Law
Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS). Those statutes
and regulations extend data privileges to those with a “need to
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know” and those with a “right to know” in law enforcement.
Agencies that share data maintained in separate case management
systems, where those systems may include some CLETS derived
information, should follow the security requirements (such as secure
network and limited access) for CLETS secondary dissemination.
Neither intellectual property nor security concerns should prohibit
this increased sharing, so long as existing security policies are
incorporated into any additional sharing procedures. Moreover, this
principle applies to sharing with federal law enforcement authorities
as well as sharing with other state or local authorities.
2. Medical information disclosure laws—the federal Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the California
Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA)—do not pose
great obstacles to information sharing. HIPAA is very weakly
enforced and has many relevant exceptions. In practice, the CMIA
governs and should accommodate information sharing. The
California Constitution and Information Practices Act add potential
complexities, but most of the relevant considerations for an
information sharing system are in CMIA and HIPAA.

3. Because of prohibitions contained in the California Constitution,
government agencies need to establish very clear procedures
controlling disclosure of information from or about crime victims.
4. Government agencies hoping to prevent disclosure of records under
the California Public Records Act (CPRA) should recognize that, on
the whole, courts construing the CPRA will tend to favor public
disclosure.
5. In regard to criminal investigations, employees of police
departments and the judicial branch are not likely to suffer any
consequences for relying on inaccurate data in executing search
warrants, so long as the errors leading to the unlawful search were
truly negligent. But where errors leading to unlawful searches are
widespread and systemic, evidence resulting from the unlawful
search may be suppressed, and employees or departments may be
subject to civil liability. The rare but successful instances of § 1983
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claims for inaccurate data strongly suggest that agencies implement
protocols that allow individuals to check and report errors in their
records, particularly where the records are widely shared and affect
that individual’s ability to take advantage of public and private
services.
6. Confidential information in the hands of government officials may
trigger a defendant’s due process right to discovery of potentially
exculpatory evidence. District Attorneys, who are legally bound to
share exculpatory information with defendants, may be responsible
for disclosing such information that is held by other agencies, if that
other agency’s system or operation is sufficiently integrated with
that of the prosecutor’s office.
7. The risks of civil liability for defamation or invasion of privacy from
the sharing of criminal justice information are very small. Broad
protections for governmental officials and agencies acting in good
faith serve to insulate them against lawsuits for wrongful disclosure,
at least in the absence of intentional or malicious conduct.
***
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I gives an overview of the data
sharing landscape. This information is included largely for nonpractitioners, as the information it contains is common knowledge to those
who work within California’s criminal justice system. Part II discusses the
“safe harbor” case of criminal justice agencies sharing summary criminal
justice information among themselves. The legal rules, in general, promote
this activity, provided that certain basic safeguards (already in place) are
followed. Part III discusses issues related to medical information governed
by HIPAA (and, to a lesser extent, the California state equivalent),
concluding that what issues there are would be easily solved. Part IV
briefly examines the special case of information about victims, which is
protected under Marsy’s Law. Part V discusses when criminal justice
agencies must disclose information to private parties under the California
Public Records Act. Part VI discusses issues relating to investigation and
litigation, specifically what might happen if law enforcement relies on
inaccurate data when conducting its investigation, and what duties
prosecutors have to disclose information to the defense. It also touches on
how evidentiary privileges might come into play with greater information
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exchange. Finally, Part VII discusses liability, concluding that there is little
scope for claims of defamation or invasion of privacy.
I. THE DATA-SHARING LANDSCAPE
This section provides a rudimentary survey of the California datasharing landscape. Most practitioners, who will already be familiar with the
main mechanisms of data exchange, can skip this section.
Information exchange in California takes place under a variety of
forms: CLETS, case management systems such as COPLINK, and Regional
Information Sharing Systems. Nearly every official working in California’s
criminal justice system should be familiar with the operation of the
California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS), the
backbone of state criminal justice information.1 In addition, most
practitioners will be familiar with case management systems (CMS’s—also
known as Records Management Systems, or RMS’s), of which the most
popular is COPLINK. These systems collect data electronically and can
share this information—to varying degrees, with varying ease—with
outside agencies. Finally, agencies also regularly share data through joint
agreements2 or under regional arrangements that disseminate data across
many different jurisdictions, most notably through Regional Information
Sharing Systems (RISS). Each of these three types of data sharing
arrangements will be discussed in turn.
CLETS. CLETS is a “high-speed communications application” that
offers law enforcement agencies access to dozens of unique databases with
local, state, federal, and international criminal justice information.3 The
state provides each county with hardware and switching center personnel
for one CLETS access point.4 Local agencies must then furnish their own
1

(As a reference guide, a separate Appendix to this Primer summarizes the basic
CLETS operational scheme and gives details on other databases.)
2

See MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT AMONG THE INTEGRATED LAW AND
JUSTICE AGENCY OF ORANGE COUNTY, THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT AND KNOWLEDGE COMPUTING CORPORATION (on file with author)
(hereinafter MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT).
3
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA LAW ENFORCEMENT
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (CLETS) 2008 STRATEGIC PLAN §2.7 (Draft Oct.
29, 2008) [hereinafter CLETS Strategic Plan].
4
Bill Lockyer, California Attorney General, Testimony to the Little Hoover
Commission Gov’t Technology Hearing (Feb. 24, 2000), available at
http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/gov’tech/LockyerFeb00.pd [hereinafter Lockyer
Testimony].
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equipment and coordinate with the county in order to connect to this
interface.5 Some agencies, like police departments, can connect directly to
CLETS using Computer Aided Dispatch systems to query CLETS from the
field.6 Most other agencies access CLETS through designated terminals,
which connect to their county’s access point and then relay information to
and from the state’s databases.
One of the primary uses of CLETS is reporting summary criminal
history information, or RAP sheets (Record of Arrest and Prosecution).7
The California Department of Justice (DOJ) must “maintain state summary
criminal history information” and “furnish” it to agencies, including among
others state courts, peace officers, prosecuting city attorneys, state district
attorneys, public defenders and child welfare agencies “when needed in the
course of their duties.”8
In order to collect this criminal history information, the California
Attorney General is required to “procure from any available source, and file
for record and report in the offices of the bureau, all . . . information . . . of
all persons convicted of a felony, or imprisoned for violating any of the
military, naval or criminal laws of the United States.”9 Each sheriff or
police chief executive must furnish to the California DOJ daily reports with
information about specific misdemeanors and felonies,10 and also notify the
California DOJ when an arrested person is transferred to another agency’s
custody or “released without having a complaint or accusation filed with a
court.”11 State courts are then obliged to report to the California DOJ when
they dispose of a case.12 In Penal Code §§ 13100 -13326, the California
Legislature has set detailed standards for the data elements that arresting
agencies and courts are required to report to the California DOJ, which the
California DOJ maintains in criminal justice databases accessible via
CLETS.
CMS. In addition to accessing data via CLETS, many cities and
5

Id.
Id.
7
See People v. Martinez, 22 Cal. 4th 106 (2000) (allowing admissibility of
RAP sheet as evidence of criminal history and discussing statutory framework
requiring the CA DOJ to maintain criminal summary information).
8
CAL. PENAL CODE §11105 (2009).
9
Id. §11101.
10
Id. §11107.
11
Id. §11115.
12
Id. §13151.
6
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counties maintain individual databases, often called “case management
systems,” tailored to their localities’ needs. These systems may operate
independently or may link with other agencies. San Francisco County, for
example, has integrated all of its criminal justice agencies into one network,
called JUSTIS, but does not intend to integrate with any other county.13
Monterey County, alternatively, attempted to integrate its Criminal Justice
Information System with four other counties—Kern, San Joaquin, Marin
and San Mateo—but those counties have “never shared data as originally
anticipated.”14 Information maintained in local systems is not identical to
the information furnished to CLETS—the CA DOJ only requires specific
reporting elements, such as records of arrest and case disposition—but local
agencies may keep richer records tailored to their local criminal justice
system, such as detailed investigation files, court dockets and jail records.
Private vendors, such as COPLINK, specialize in technology that
links these case management systems to allow for real-time “complex data
searches” across multiple databases in order to “uncover hidden
relationships” and aid in investigations.15 Agencies might favor systems like
COPLINK because users can access information via the web from their own
computer terminals, instead of being limited to designated CLETS access
points. They can also share the information in their individual case
management systems, which may contain more detailed records than the
California DOJ requests. Agencies wishing to share data with one another
in this way often enter into contracts or joint powers agreements,16 because
unlike the myriad information sharing statutes that govern the California
DOJ’s data requirements, no explicit statutory mechanism exists to provide
for information sharing between organizations.
RISS. Data sharing also takes place on a national level. The U.S.
Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance has funded Regional
Information Sharing Systems (RISS), which operates via secure intranet “to
13

See Office of Budget Analyst, San Francisco, The Justice Information
Tracking
System
(JUSTIS),
http://www.sfgov.org/site/budanalyst_page.asp?id=68983.
14
COUNTY OF MONTEREY, ADDENDUM TO REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL FOR
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT SERVICES FOR THE REPLACEMENT AND/OR UPGRADE OF
THE JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS FOR THE COUNTY OF MONTEREY 2 (July 18,
2006),
available
at
http://www.co.monterey.ca.us/iss/pdf/Addendum%20RFP%209901.pdf.
15
COPLINK, http://www.coplink.com (last visited October 19, 2009).
16
CAL GOV’T CODE §6500 (2009) (Granting authority to enter into Joint
Powers Agreements). See, e.g., MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT, supra note 2.
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facilitate law enforcement communications and information sharing
nationwide.”17 RISS systems divide the nation into six regional “RISS
Intelligence Centers.”18 California is a member of the Western States
Information Network, with other member agencies in Alaska, California,
Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington, Canada and Guam.19
The increased sharing of criminal justice information poses
challenges beyond issues of technological integration. Federal, state and
local agencies have many security and privacy concerns, raising
“[q]uestions such as who owns the data, who has access to the data, [and]
who has the right to use the data.”20
II. DISCLOSURE OF SUMMARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION
Generally, sharing criminal justice information with other criminal
justice agencies raises no legal red flags—and, in fact, this sharing is
required in some circumstances. There are well-established rules and
regulations involving the dissemination of CLETS information—so there is
little that should be novel or uncertain about sharing this information. The
discussion that follows will be framed by three separate issues: when
information must be disclosed, when it may be disclosed, and when it may
not be disclosed. The analysis is complicated slightly by the fact that there
are two types of criminal justice information—summary information and
non-summary information—and that there are several kinds of agencies to
whom such information might potentially be disclosed. An analysis of the
issues involved in disclosure of information depends first on the kind of
information, and second on the agency to which the information is
disclosed. This section deals with summary information disclosed to
different types of agencies.
The California Penal Code creates a strong foundation for integrated
criminal justice information systems and, more generally, formalized
information sharing among actors in the criminal justice system.21 Penal
Code Section 13100, in part, recognizes the need for improved access and
sharing of information across criminal justice agencies.22 Penal Code
17

Regional Information Sharing Systems, http://www.riss.net/overview.aspx
(last visited October 19, 2009).
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Lockyer Testimony, supra note 4.
21
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11105(A)-(S) (2008).
22
The California Penal Code defines criminal justice agencies as “those
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Section 13100(a) explains that “the criminal justice agencies in this state
require, for the performance of their official duties, accurate and reasonably
complete offender record information.”23 Penal Code 13100(e), in turn,
states that “the recording, reporting, storage, analysis, and dissemination of
criminal offender information in this state must be made more uniform and
efficient, and better controlled and coordinated.”24
Summary criminal justice information is information pertaining to “the
identification and criminal history of any person, such as name, date of
birth, physical description, dates of arrest, arresting agencies and booking
numbers, charges, dispositions, and similar data about a former criminal
offender.”25 Local law enforcement agencies are allowed to freely
exchange summary criminal history information (i.e. RAP sheets), provided
that the information is a product of the agencies’ independent efforts and it
is not an investigatory record.
Non-summary information includes information such as
intelligence, analytical, or investigative reports and files, or sensitive
individual information as it evolves during the stages of prosecution,
incarceration, probation, and parole. Non-summary information is defined
negatively by the statute: “[L]ocal summary criminal history information
does not refer to records and data compiled by criminal justice agencies
other than that local agency, nor does it refer to records of complaints to or
investigations conducted by, or records of intelligence information or
security procedures of, the local agency.”26
Victims’ information is also not included in summary information.
The California Constitution contains a Victims’ Bill of Rights (VBR),
which sets strict prohibitions on the type of information state and county
agencies can release about a victim or a victim’s family. California voters
updated the VBR in 2008 through Proposition 9, introducing several layers
of complexity to issues surrounding the release of victim information and
the victim’s right to refuse discovery requests by the defense. Due to the
agencies at all levels of government which perform as their principle functions,
activities which either: (a) relate to the apprehension, prosecution, adjudication,
incarceration, or correction of criminal offenders; or (b) relate to the collection,
storage, dissemination or usage of criminal offender record information.” Id. §
13101(A)-(B).
23
Id. § 13100(A).
24
Id. § 13100(E).
25
Id. § 13300(A)(1).
26
CAL. PENAL CODE § 13300(a)(2) (2009).
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recent enactment of Proposition 9, courts have yet to offer guidance on how
the statute should be interpreted. In the meantime, state and county agencies
should establish very clear procedures on how to tag, exclude, or excise this
information so that the general public and/or defense does not gain access.27
The Victims’ Bill of Rights is discussed in greater detail infra in Part IV.
Generally speaking, disclosure of summary criminal justice information
to other criminal justice agencies will expose an agency to no liability,
particularly if both have access to CLETS.
A. Disclosure of Summary Information to California Criminal Justice
Agencies
Criminal justice agencies in California are required to compile local
summary criminal history information. The California Penal Code defines
criminal justice agencies as “those agencies at all levels of government
which perform as their principle functions, activities which either: (a) relate
to the apprehension, prosecution, adjudication, incarceration, or correction
of criminal offenders; or (b) relate to the collection, storage, dissemination
or usage of criminal offender record information.” Id. § 13101(A)-(B).
Penal Code Section 13300(1) sets for the requirements for collecting
and disseminating selected “local summary criminal history information.”28
A local criminal justice agency must, upon request, share local summary
criminal history information with selected parties, including public
defenders and attorneys of record, district attorneys, courts, probation
officers, and the former criminal offender.29 And these sections of the
Penal Code are intimately tied to Government Code Section 15152 et seq.,
establishing the CLETS system, because they clarify the data elements to be
27

The VBR creates three sets of issues for criminal justice information sharing, and
these issues vary in their relevance and clarity.
First, many provisions of the VBR involve certain “criminal procedure rights” for
victims, including the ability to participate in legal proceedings and to confer with
prosecutors over the disposition of cases. On the whole, these provisions, though important
and controversial, have no bearing on the information issues in this Primer.
Second, the VBR grants victims a right to be informed of certain aspects of the case as
it proceeds. This set of rights involves a kind of required information-sharing. Because
this information is usually public anyway, the rights simply accelerate disclosure and
personal notice.
Finally, and most relevant to this Primer, the VBR sets limits on disclosure of certain
categories of information about victims. The bulk of this section deals with those
restrictions.
28
29

Id. § 13300(3)(B)(1)-(16).
Id. § 13300(3)(B)(1)-(16).
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used in criminal justice databases accessible via CLETS.
The aspect of CLETS most relevant to this Primer is the secondary
dissemination of CLETS information. (Agencies regularly share data
through joint agreements30 or under regional arrangements that disseminate
data across many different jurisdictions, most notably through Regional
Information Sharing Systems (RISS)). The California Department of
Justice explicitly allows secondary dissemination of information accessed
through CLETS, provided certain regulations are followed.31 RISS users,
who are funded by the federal government, must similarly comply with
federal privacy regulations prior to secondary dissemination.32 These
security regulations do not prevent secondary data sharing entirely, but must
be incorporated into joint power agreements or contracts with third-party
vendors in order to protect privacy and security concerns.
The California Attorney General is “responsible for the security of
criminal record information” and is required to enact regulations to protect
criminal records from “unauthorized access and disclosure.”33 Information
can be shared only when it is “demonstrably required” for “an agency’s or
official’s functions.”34 Secondary dissemination of CLETS information to
other law enforcement agencies, including federal agencies, is proper if a
"compelling need" is demonstrated and "the information is needed for the
performance of their official duties."35 The California DOJ defines the
criterion for release – release occurs “on a need-to-know basis . . . to
persons or agencies authorized by court order, statute, or decisional law to
receive criminal offender record information.”36 These security
30

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT, supra note 2.
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CLETS POLICIES, PRACTICES
AND PROCEDURES §1.6.4(J) (Draft Oct. 2008) [hereinafter CLETS PPPS]
(“Secondary dissemination and remote access to data accessed via the CLETS
using communications media (including the Internet) is allowed when a minimum
set of administrative and technical requirements that include the encryption and
firewall requirements . . . are met. . . . Any secondary dissemination of the data
must be secure and only to those who are authorized to receive the data.”).
32
“Each RISS center must comply with DOJ, BJA Program Guidelines.
Information retained in RISS criminal intelligence databases must also comply
with the Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies (Federal Regulation 28
CFR
Part
23).”
Regional
Information
Sharing
Systems,
http://www.riss.net/overview.aspx (last visited March 20, 2009).
33
CAL. PENAL CODE § 11077 (2009).
34
Id.
35
See id. §11105(c)(5).
36
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 703 (2009).
31
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requirements apply not only to the records maintained by the California
DOJ, but also to criminal justice records containing CLETS material
maintained by any local or state criminal justice agency.37
To ensure that agencies conform to applicable security requirements
when accessing CLETS data, the California legislature has directed the
Attorney General to establish an Advisory Committee to draft CLETS
“Policies, Practices and Procedures” (PPPs).38 The PPPs classify CLETS
information as “confidential,” and, tracking the regulatory language, limit
access to “authorized law enforcement or criminal justice personnel” on a
“right-to-know and need-to-know” basis.39
B. Disclosure of Summary Information to Criminal Justice Agencies
Outside the State of California
Agencies that wish to access CLETS data in the first instance must
apply to become subscribers of CLETS and win approval by the Advisory
Committee.40 Because the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are officially certified subscribers, both
agencies are treated like state criminal justice agencies, openly sharing
relevant CLETS information for active investigations.41
In sum, California officials who are part of CLETS can be confident
that any secondary dissemination of CLETS information to another state or
37

Criminal Record Information is defined as “records and data compiled by
criminal justice agencies for purposes of identifying criminal offenders and of
maintaining as to each such offender a summary of arrests, pretrial proceedings,
the nature and disposition of criminal charges, sentencing, incarceration,
rehabilitation, and release.” CAL PENAL CODE §11075
38
CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 15154, 15160 (2009).
39
CLETS PPPS, supra note 31, at § 1.6.4.
40
Id. at §1.3 (listing the FBI as a Class I authorized subscriber, and also listing
non-law enforcement personnel under Class II and III levels).
41
Even when local authorities share non-CLETS information with federal
authorities for law enforcement purposes, including information from Records
Management Systems or Computer Aided Dispatch, there is little danger of being
sued for invasion of privacy. If the information is public record, for instance, the
disclosure would be controlled by the CPRA, discussed in Part III. If a federal
agent uses the information illegally, that agent, not the local authority, would be
responsible for the illegal activity. There are few other legal remedies for alleged
privacy violations as a result of disclosure. See, e.g., Hilary Hylton, Fusion
Centers: Giving Cops Too Much Information, TIME, Mar. 9, 2009,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1883101,00.html.
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federal law enforcement agency for a legitimate law enforcement purpose
will not create legal liability, so long as they comply with CLETS security
rules, discussed in Section C infra. Those rules are somewhat technical and
complex, especially those concerning who is a subscriber agency and when
information can be released to a non-subscriber agency with a need to know
related to law enforcement. The key to compliance is for all officials with
power over CLETS information to be familiar with the rules in the latest
CLETS PPPs. That document contains a user-friendly guide to the rules,
along with sample forms for situations like the release of information to
non-subscribers.
C. Disclosure of Summary Information to California Agencies that are not
part of the Criminal Justice System
Once an agency, federal or local, has access to CLETS, it must
comply with the confidentiality policies and technical security requirements
of the PPPs. Agencies cannot access or secondarily release CLETS
information “for non-law enforcement purposes . . . unless otherwise
mandated,” and, if they do, they are “subject to administrative action and/or
criminal prosecution.”42 Secondary dissemination of CLETS data,
particularly through regional or interagency sharing arrangements,
moreover, must comply with electronic security requirements, including
“encryption and firewall” protections. Secondary dissemination specifically
requires that CLETS information be released only to “those who are
[otherwise] authorized to receive the data,” specifically an agency that is a
valid law-enforcement organization with a need-to-know or right-toknow.43 This limitation generally prevents local police departments from
sharing CLETS derived information with organizations like local health
providers or human service agencies, which are not law enforcement
agencies with a right to access CLETS data directly.
III. MEDICAL INFORMATION: INFORMATION SHARING AND THE HEALTH
INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT (HIPAA)

42

CLETS PPPs, supra note 31, at §§ 1.6.4; 1.10; see also CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 11141-11144 (2009) (explaining that Department of Justice employees who
give (or receive) criminal history information to unauthorized parties is guilty of a
misdemeanor); Id. § 13302 (2009) (local criminal justice agency employees are
guilty of misdemeanor when furnish a criminal record to unauthorized individual).
Officials, however, would have a defense if the transfer of information were
necessary for the apprehension of a person suspected of a crime. Id. § 13304(c).
43
CLETS PPPS, supra note 31, at § 1.6.4.
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Criminal justice agencies want information about the health needs of
people under their care or supervision. The issue in this section deals
primarily with health care providers’ reported reluctance to share medical
information out of the belief that it will compromise patient privacy under
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).
The HIPAA “Privacy Rule,” which took effect in 2001, regulates the use
and disclosure of health information held by covered entities.44 Generally,
HIPAA requires an individual’s valid authorization to reveal the
individual’s “Protected Health Information,” which is broadly defined to
include any information concerning the person’s health status, provision of
medical care, or payment for care that can in any way be identified to him
or her.45 One component of HIPAA deals with individuals’ entitlement to
get their own medical information from covered entities. Another confirms
that individuals can consent to or authorize disclosure of medical
information to third parties, although even then the covered entity is
required to limit any such disclosure to the minimum necessary to
accomplish the intended purpose motivating the person’s permission.46 Of
key relevance to this Primer are HIPAA’s provisions that permit disclosure
to third parties without the individual’s permission.47
Many officials are generally aware of HIPAA and understandably
worry that it may constrain their use of information about individual
records, but these concerns are largely unfounded. These default rules are
punctuated with an array of exceptions that make HIPAA “a maze of
intertwined and interlocking puzzle pieces”48 but the ultimate inference to
be drawn from this legal maze is fairly straightforward: HIPAA rarely poses
challenges to officials in criminal justice agencies if they use medical
information for any conventional criminal justice purpose.
HIPAA only directly applies to “covered entities.” These include
44

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH
INFORMATION PRIVACY: SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE (2009),
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/index.html
(last
visited Apr. 16, 2009).
45
45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(1) (2009).
46
45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b) (2009).
47
Such disclosure is often described as “unauthorized” disclosure, although
that term is confusing. It is not authorized by the individual but may be authorized
by statute or regulation.
48
Tamela J. White & Charlotte A. Hoffman, The Privacy Standards Under the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act: A Practical Guide to
Promote Order and Avoid Potential Chaos. 106 W. VA. L. REV. 709, 712 (2004).
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(1) health plans (such as health insurance companies or Medicaid), (2)
health care clearinghouses (entities that process nonstandard health
information, such as billing companies that convert information into data
content); and (3) health care providers (such as hospitals and doctors).49
Thus, justice agencies like courts and law enforcement agencies will rarely
generate the information that is protected by the HIPAA privacy rule.
Normally, the only “covered entities” within the justice system will be
prisons or jails directly providing health care. In such cases, the medical
personnel in the place of incarceration need to be aware of HIPAA, just as if
they were working in civilian hospitals or clinics, and their non-medical
supervisors will have to ensure that the medical personnel remain in
compliance.
HIPAA, as a result, mainly affects criminal justice agencies in their
role as potential receivers of medical information from covered entities:
health care providers might be reluctant to release information to
governmental agencies because those providers fear liability under HIPAA.
The key concern in this section is how covered providers can be assured
that justice agencies who receive information are complying with HIPAA in
their inter-agency information sharing and therefore do not expose the
entities to liability.
A. HIPAA Liability for Covered Entities
Despite the concerns of health care providers, HIPAA penalties have
rarely been imposed. Criminal justice agencies seeking health care
information must nevertheless expect covered entities to be risk-averse to
extensive information disclosure and potential liability. The criminal
justice agencies must, as a result, be conversant with the rules and
exceptions in HIPAA to assure providers that they will not risk liability by
improperly transferring information.
Illustrative civil penalties for a single HIPAA violation by an
institution (referred to as a violation of an “identical requirement or
prohibition”) can be up to $25,000 a year.50 Depending on how narrowly
the phrase “identical requirement or prohibition” is construed, the
maximum annual penalty could be many times more than $25,000.51
49

45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2009).
42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5 (2000).
51
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH
INFORMATION PRIVACY: CASE EXAMPLES AND RESOLUTION AGREEMENTS
(2009), http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/examples/index.html
50

18

DATA SHARING LEGAL PRIMER

[12 Dec. 2010]

HIPAA also includes penalties for individuals who violate the statute,
including a $50,000 fine and up to one year in prison for a knowing
violation, and a $250,000 fine and up to ten years in prison for a violation
for financial gain.52
Despite these statutory penalties, HIPAA is rarely enforced.53
Violations are not enforced in court because the statute contains no private
right of action.54 In fact, an individual’s only response to a perceived
HIPAA violation is to file a complaint with the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS).55 In the past, HHS has been extremely reluctant to
impose penalties – not one of the thousands of complaints filed before 2008
resulted in a single penalty being imposed.56 As of March 31, 2009, HHS
has received over 43,052 HIPAA privacy complaints. HHS has dismissed
the vast majority of these cases and resolved the others by requiring entities
to implement new policies.57 HHS has imposed sanctions a mere two
times.58

(last visited Apr. 16, 2009) (referring to case where sanctions are imposed as
“resolution agreements”).
52
42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(b) (2000).
53
Rob Stein, Medical Privacy Law Nets No Fines, WASH. POST, June 5, 2006,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpat
A01,
available
at
dyn/content/article/2006/06/04/AR2006060400672.html
54
Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 572 (5th Cir. 2006); see also 45 CFR §
160.306(a) (2009).
55
45 C.F.R. § 160.306(a) (2009).
56
JOHN PETRILA, NAT’L GAINS CTR., DISPELLING MYTHS ABOUT
INFORMATION SHARING BETWEEN THE MENTAL HEALTH AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEMS 4 (2007); see also Joshua D.W. Collins, Toothless HIPAA: Searching for
a Private Right of Action to Remedy Privacy Rule Violations, 60 VAND. L. REV.
199, 202 n.15 (2007).
57
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH
INFORMATION
PRIVACY:
ENFORCEMENT
HIGHLIGHTS
(2009),
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/highlights/index.html
(last
visited Apr. 16, 2009).
58
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra
note 212 (referring to case where sanctions are imposed as “resolution
agreements”). Criminal sanctions have been similarly sparse. As of March, 2009,
there have been eight criminal convictions under HIPAA; in each case, the
convicted individual used private medical information for personal financial gain.
See Rebecca Herold, HIPAA Criminal Convictions Outpace Sanctions,
SEARCHCOMPLIANCE.COM,
Mar.
23,
2009,
http://searchcompliance.techtarget.com/tip/0,289483,sid195_gci1351658,00.html.
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Despite the rarity of sanctions, government agencies might face
significant challenges when seeking information from health care providers.
HHS has the power to change its tactics any time. In fact, there are some
signs that enforcement is rising: both instances of sanctions were recent
(July 16th, 2008 and January 16th, 2009).59 Even more troubling, the
sanctions were significant ($100,000 for failing to safeguard information
against theft and loss, and a $2.25 million against CVS for failing to dispose
properly of protected health information and for failing to sanction
employees who violated HIPAA). In the approximately 8,000 other cases
not dismissed for lack of merit, however, HHS has simply directed
providers to change their policies.60
Criminal justice agencies can utilize several arguments to reassure
health care entities reluctant to produce information. Even if the HHS
accelerates enforcement, it is highly unlikely that it would impose penalties
on entities collaborating with governmental agencies in good faith,
particularly those in the criminal justice system.61 But the best assurance
that a criminal justice agency can give a health care provider is that that the
request is explicitly permissible under HIPAA. The key, therefore, is that
criminal justice agencies understand the HIPAA exceptions.
B. HIPAA Exceptions
HIPAA presumptively requires an individual’s valid authorization to

59

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra
note 212 (referring to case where sanctions are imposed as “resolution
agreements”).
60
Id.; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
supra note 219.
61
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH
INFORMATION PRIVACY: SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE (2009),
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/index.html
(last
visited Apr. 16, 2009) (“Covered entities may rely on professional ethics and best
judgments in deciding which of these permissive uses and disclosures to make.”);
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH
INFORMATION
PRIVACY:
ALL
CASE
EXAMPLES
(2009),
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/examples/allcases.html#case17
(last visited Apr. 16, 2009).
In this case, a chain pharmacy violated HIPAA in impermissible uses and
disclosures to law enforcement officials. OCR directed the chain to revise its
policy, revealing information “only in response to written requests from law
enforcement officials.”
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reveal that individual’s health information 62 and, as noted, the covered
entity must also limit any information it discloses to the minimum necessary
to accomplish the purpose intended by the individual.63 But exceptions to
HIPAA delineate a subset of information that may be released without
authorization in particular circumstances; those relevant here are
disclosures:
1. To a correctional institution and other law enforcement custodial
situations;64
2. For treatment purposes;65
3. To the extent that disclosure is required by law;66
4. About victims of abuse, neglect or domestic violence;67
5. For judicial and administrative proceedings;68
6. To avert a serious threat to health or safety;69
7. For law enforcement purposes.70
As discussed more below, HIPAA will sometimes permit disclosure
if a particular state law mandates it. This principle raises an unusual
inconsistency under HIPAA. On the one hand, the HIPAA exceptions do
not allow the disclosure of notes taken during a private counseling session,
which always require authorization.71 On the other hand, California’s
Tarasoff principle requires a psychotherapist to disclose information from a
private counseling conversation when the client poses a potential danger to
others.72 This requirement, in turn, triggers HIPAA’s exception for a use or
disclosure that is required by law, meaning that the notes can be disclosed
without fear of HIPAA sanctions.73 (This particular example would also
trigger the HIPAA exception for avoiding a threat to public safety,
62

45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(1) (2009).
Id. § 164.502(b).
64
Id. § 164.512(k)(5).
65
Id. § 164.502(a)(1)(ii).
66
Id. § 164.512(a).
67
Id. § 164.512(c).
68
Id. § 164.512(e).
69
Id. § 164.512(j).
70
Id. § 164.512(f).
71
Id. § 164.508(2).
72
Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 347 (Cal. 1976)
(“[T]he public policy favoring protection of the confidential character of patientpsychotherapist communications must yield to the extent to which disclosure is
essential to avert danger to others. The protective privilege ends where the public
peril begins.”).
73
45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a)(1) (2009).
63
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discussed infra at 23.)
Key aspects of the HIPAA exceptions include:
1. A Custodial Situation
A covered entity may disclose protected health information to a
correctional institution or a law enforcement official who has lawful
custody over an individual.74 When an individual ceases to be in lawful
custody (for instance, when he begins parole or supervised release), these
provisions no longer apply.75 While the individual is in custody, disclosure
may be made only insofar as necessary for:
1. Providing health care to the individual;
2. The health and safety of the individual, other inmates, employees, or
others at the correctional institution;
3. The health and safety of those transporting the individual;
4. Law enforcement on premises of a correctional institution, or the
maintenance of safety, security and good order of the correctional
institution.76
This exception will encompass a wide array of desired uses of
medical information. But it only applies while the individual is in custody;
it will not reach individuals who are on community supervision, and it
focuses on treatment or general safety purposes, not law enforcement
broadly defined. Moreover, it is unclear whether dealing with an
individual’s drug or mental health problems will always qualify as
treatment or as necessary for safety. Nevertheless, even this limited
exception will encompass many desired uses, and citing this exception can
be effective in reassuring reluctant covered entities to release information.
2. For Treatment Purposes
Unauthorized disclosure is permitted “for treatment activities of a
health care provider.”77 The regulations do not stipulate who qualifies as a
74

Id. § 164.512(k)(5)(i).
Id. § 164.512(k)(5)(iii).
76
Id. § 164.512(k)(5)(i).
77
Id. § 154.506(c)(2).
75
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health care provider. They do specify that “[a] covered entity may disclose
protected health information to another covered entity or a health care
provider for the payment activities”78 (emphasis added). Thus, the
regulations seem to contemplate a health care provider who is not a covered
entity. If a health care provider is broadly defined, many aspects of criminal
justice information sharing could fall into this exception. It is possible that
even a police officer acting as a treatment facilitator could qualify as “a
health care provider” who is not a covered entity. In the absence of case law
interpreting this language, however, it is unclear whether the regulations
intend this broad reading.
3. Disclosure Required by Law
A covered entity may use or disclose protected information to the
extent that such use or disclosure is required by another law.79 In disclosing
the information required by another law, “the covered entity must simply
comply with the requirements of the other law.”80 This is a broad exception;
“law” includes “the full array of binding legal authority, such as
constitutions, statutes, rules, regulations. . . . It encompasses federal, state or
local actions with legally binding effect.”81
This exception would facilitate receiving information from outside
agencies whenever a law requires disclosure. Thus, if California passes a
law requiring disclosure of medical information, for instance in response to
a written request by a governmental agency, virtually all legal hurdles
would be eliminated. This requirement would satisfy HIPAA. It would, as
discussed below, also satisfy requirements of the Confidential Medical
Information Act (CMIA). The only limitation requires that the use be
reasonable so as not to violate the right to privacy under the California
Constitution.82
4. Victims of Abuse, Neglect, or Domestic Violence
Information about victims of abuse, neglect, or domestic violence
may be disclosed only when disclosure is expressly authorized by law. The
78

Id.
Id. § 164.512(a)(1).
80
Prot. & Advocacy Sys., Inc. v. Freudenthal, 412 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1218 (D.
Wyo. 2006) (citing Ohio Legal Rights Serv. v. Buckeye Ranch, Inc., 365 F. Supp.
2d 877, 886 (S.D. Ohio 2005)).
81
Id.
79

82

See note 286, infra, and accompanying text.
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victim, moreover, must be unable to agree to the disclosure because of
incapacity. Disclosure may also be justified if it is necessary to prevent
serious harm to the victim or other potential victims.83
5. For Judicial and Administrative Proceedings
In the course of a judicial or administrative proceeding, a covered
entity may disclose protected information expressly authorized by a court
order.84 It may also reveal information in response to a subpoena, discovery
request, or “other lawful process.”85 In this case, California law requires
that the requesting party serve a Consumer Notice to the individual whose
records are being sought before those records can be disclosed.86 As
discussed below, having judges issue standing court orders mandating the
sharing of relevant information is a possible way to avoid HIPAA concerns.
This is a particularly useful tool because, under California law, entities are
required rather than simply permitted to disclose information pursuant to a
court order.87 Thus, if a county has a standing court order that medical
records of arrested individuals be released to the arresting officer, a health
care provider will be required, rather than simply permitted, to disclose the
medical record.
Note that these exceptions establish that even when HIPAA operates
as a confidentiality law—i.e., limiting out-of-court disclosure—it does not
serve as an evidentiary privilege law (see, supra, Part VI. C.). That is, the
covered entity does not have any privilege to resist providing evidence or
testimony in a formal legal proceedings.
6. To Avoid a Serious Threat to Health and Safety
A covered entity may also reveal health information necessary to
prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of an
individual or to the public.88 This includes identifying or apprehending an
individual who “appears from all circumstances” to have escaped from a
correctional institution or other lawful custody.89 It may also be used to
identify an individual who confessed to participating in a violent crime,
83

45 C.F.R. § 164.512(c) (2009).
Id. § 164.512(e)(i).
85
Id. § 164.512(e)(ii).
86
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1985.3 (2005).
87
CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.10(b) (2009).
88
45 C.F.R. § 164.512(j) (2009).
89
Id. § 164.512(j)(1)(ii)(B).
84
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unless the confession was made through a request by the individual to
receive counseling90 or during treatment to reduce the propensity to commit
such a crime.91 The release must be made to a person able to prevent or
lessen the threat, such as a police officer or the target of the threat.92 The
releasable information is limited to the statement itself, and identifying
information such as the individual’s name and physical appearance.93
7. Law Enforcement Purposes
Under certain circumstances, a covered entity “may disclose health
information for a law enforcement purpose to a law enforcement official.”94
Besides circumstances that fall into one of the previously addressed
exceptions, disclosure is also permitted, subject to the Victims’ Bill of
Rights, when:
1. The individual is suspected of being the victim of a crime, and the
covered entity is unable to obtain permission to release from the
individual. Further, the information must be necessary to investigate
the crime;95 or
2. The individual is dead, and the covered entity has a suspicion that
such death may have resulted from criminal conduct;96 or
3. The information is evidence of criminal conduct that occurred on the
premises of the covered entity;97 or
4. There is a medical emergency, not on the premises of the covered
entity, and release of the information is necessary to report the
nature or location of a crime, or the identities of those involved in a
crime.98
C. Policy Suggestions for Information Sharing Under HIPAA

90

Id. § 164.512(j)(2)(ii).
Id. § 164.512(j)(2)(i).
92
Id. § 164.512(j)(1)(i)(B).
93
Id. § 164.512(j)(3).
94
Id. § 164.512(f).
95
Id. § 164.512(f)(3)(ii).
96
Id. § 164.512(f)(4).
97
Id. § 164.512(f)(5).
98
Id. § 164.512(f)(6).
91
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Because there is always the threat of sanctions, even “toothless”99
HIPAA provisions can interfere with information sharing. Where
information does not clearly fall into one of the HIPAA exceptions, or
where only some of the information falls into an exception, several options
remain.
•

HHS Advisory Opinion: The best solution is for the HHS to issue an
advisory opinion that HIPAA will not be enforced against criminal
justice information sharing. The HHS could posit that such sharing
would fall within HIPAA, that it will simply not enforce HIPAA
provisions against entities responding to governmental requests for
information, or even that it will limit any interference to policy
recommendation rather than sanctions.

•

State or Local Law Requiring Disclosure: California could pass a
law (or several local laws can be passed) requiring disclosure to
governmental agencies.

•

Uniform Consent Forms:100 An individual entering the criminal
justice system could sign a form listing all relevant entities who can
receive the information (e.g. parole officers, police officers, prison
officials), thus obtaining the individual’s consent for each entity on
the list. An individual could either check a box next to each entity or
could sign a statement that he authorizes disclosure to ‘all the
entities listed above.’

•

Judicial Order: Another option used in some jurisdictions is for
judges to create judicial orders with standard language mandating
the sharing of information with relevant entities.101 To comply with
California law, a Consumer Notice would have to be delivered to the
individual before records are disclosed.102

•

Case-by-case Clarification for Outside Agencies: Before one of the
above approaches takes effect, criminal justice agencies could
persuade outside agencies to share information by citing the low
enforceability of HIPAA or a relevant exception that makes the
disclosure permissible.

99

Collins, supra note 58, at 199.
PETRILA, supra note 58, at 3.
101
Id.
102
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. § 1985.3 (2005).
100
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D. State Law and the Confidential Medical Information Act (CMIA)
Because the enforceability of HIPAA has been limited, many of the
problems of information sharing might, instead, arise directly under relevant
state law. California’s version of HIPAA is the Confidentiality of Medical
Information Act (CMIA). Under CMIA, a patient who is harmed through
unlawful disclosure can receive monetary damages. CMIA provides that
violations are misdemeanors;103 it entitles the patient to compensatory
damages, up to $3,000 in punitive damages, up to $1,000 in attorney’s fees,
and litigation costs.104
A key question is when HIPAA preempts provisions of state law. In
the abstract, federal law, under the Supremacy Clause, preempts state law
whenever the two are contradictory. But that abstract principle is very
difficult to apply in specific instances, because whether two laws are
contradictory or mutually inconsistent cannot always be derived from
statutory language; it requires reference to the statutes’ manifest purposes
and operations.
Like some other complex federal laws, the HIPAA Privacy rules
contain their own preemption rules. They look dauntingly complex
themselves, but their implications are fairly clear.
The best way to imagine the preemption rule is as follows: since
HIPAA’s purpose is to guide officials of covered entities in regard to
disclosure, first one asks whether a state official faces any contradiction in
complying with both HIPAA and the state law in question. If doing
something she is permitted or required to do under state law would require
her to simultaneously violate HIPAA, then federal law nullifies the state
law. Thus, in general terms, if a state law permits or requires a disclosure of
protected medical information where HIPAA bars it, then the official must
comply with the HIPAA bar.
HIPAA, nevertheless, contains provisions whereby an apparent
preemption is overcome. For example, when a state rule appears
preempted, the Secretary of HHS can still defer to the state law. In such
situations, it is necessary that the Secretary seek to prevent abuse in health
care or regulation of health insurance, and that there be a compelling public
103
104

CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.36 (2009).
Id.
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safety justification as balanced against privacy (unless the state law is more
stringent in its protections).
Thus, HIPAA preempts a contrary state law only insofar as the state
law provision is less stringent than HIPAA.105 The more restrictive
provision between HIPAA and state law will consequently govern. HIPAA
provisions are more restrictive in a majority of cases. A few particularly
relevant distinctions between HIPAA and CMIA are:
•

CMIA allows broad disclosure for medical purposes, including
disclosure to health care providers, service plans, contractors,
and “other health care professionals or facilities,” and permits
disclosure for diagnosis as well as treatment.106 This exception is
more likely to encompass activities of criminal justice agents
than HIPAA, which allows disclosure only for treatment and
only to a health care provider.107 HIPAA would thus apply.

•

A section of CMIA added in 2007 allows disclosure of medical
information to a county social worker, a probation officer, or any
other person legally authorized to have custody or care of a
minor for purposes of coordinating health care services and
medical treatment for the minor.108 HIPAA does not specifically
address parole officers, but allows disclosure to anyone acting
“in loco parentis,” unless the only consent required is the
consent of the unanticipated minor.109 HIPAA would thus apply.

•

CMIA requires, rather than simply permits disclosure pursuant
to a court order or a search warrant.110 CMIA would thus apply.

HIPAA provisions are the more restrictive in a majority of cases,
but—likely due to the lack of a private right of action and general low
enforceability of HIPAA—California cases about disclosure of medical
information consider only state law.111 In a 2006 case, for instance, the
105

45 C.F.R. § 160.203(b) (2009).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.10(c)(1) (2009).
107
45 C.F.R. § 154.506(c)(2) (2009).
108
CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.103 (2009).
109
45 C.F.R. 164.502(g)(1)(3) (2009).
110
CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.10(b) (2009).
111
See, e.g., Cal. Consumer Health Care Council v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan,
Inc., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 593, 597 (Ct. App. 2006) (ruling based on exception in
106
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court held that release of medical information to attorneys was authorized
by CMIA despite plaintiffs’ claim that some of the information was
irrelevant. The court held that “the Legislature specifically elected not to
graft a relevancy limitation onto the section 56.10(c)(4) exception.”
However, an exception without a relevancy limitation is preempted by
HIPAA’s more stringent “minimum necessary” requirement. Technically,
HIPAA governed and the plaintiffs should have prevailed. Yet the court did
not address the issue, nor did the decision mention HIPAA.112
Insofar as California law governs even where HIPAA would be
more stringent, CMIA offers a simple solution. It holds that “information
may be disclosed when the disclosure is otherwise specifically authorized
by law, including, but not limited to, the voluntary reporting” to the FDA.113
This exception applies whenever a law indicates that disclosure should
occur. Courts have interpreted the “authorized by law” exception very
broadly. In Shaddox v. Bertani, a dentist reported his suspicions that a
police officer patient had a prescription drug problem to the officer’s
superiors.114 The court held that the dentist’s actions were lawful because
city charter provisions encouraged reporting of complaints of police
misconduct. This qualified as “specifically authorized,” although the
provisions did not mention medical information. Shaddox also indicates that
CMIA governs: it explicitly acknowledged HIPAA,115 but decided the case
solely by reference to CMIA.116
The best option to satisfy CMIA would be to pass a law at the city, county,
or state level that authorizes disclosure of medical information. Under
Shaddox, this law could simply be a statement that the State of California
encourages criminal justice information sharing. A legal authorization
CMIA, although the CMIA exception would be preempted by HIPAA’s minimum
necessary standard); Colleen M. v. Fertility & Surgical Assoc. of Thousand Oaks
(2005) 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 439, 443 (Ct. App. 2005) (.holding that a clinic’s
disclosure of medical information to ex-fiancé was authorized under CMIA
56.10(c)(2) when the patient used ex-fiancé’s credit card to pay at health clinic,
even though the disclosure technically violated HIPAA’s requirement that payment
information be released only to a health care provider or other covered entity (45
C.F.R. § 154.506(c)(2)).
112
Cal. Consumer Health Care, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 597.
113
CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.10(c)(12) (2009).
114
Shaddox v. Bertani, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 808, 817 (Ct. App. 2003).
115
Id. (mentioning the passage of HIPAA as an example of “concerns about
medical privacy”).
116
Id. at 814-15.
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would trigger the 56.10(c)(4) exception. Though it wouldn’t satisfy HIPAA,
California case law indicates that HIPAA does not normally come into play
in California cases. Moreover, an explicit authorization at the state level
would make any adverse action by the HHS under HIPAA even more
unlikely.
IV. VICTIMS’ ISSUES
The California Victims’ Bill of Rights (VBR) changes the information
exchange landscape in two ways. First, it grants crime victims the right to
access summary information. Second, it limits the disclosure of
information about victims. Each will be discussed in turn.
A. Disclosure of Summary Information to Victims
Proposition 8 (the Victims’ Bill of Rights) was passed in 1982 and
amended the California Constitution. It also enacted several statutes,
including those concerned with the rights victims to be notified in advance
of sentencing and parole hearings, as well as to participate in and offer a
victim statement in these hearings.117 Proposition 9 (Victims’ Rights and
Protection Act), more commonly known as Marsy’s Law, was approved in
2008 with the goal of broadening victims’ rights and making them more
enforceable. The 2008 law provides a basic definition of what it means to
be a victim under the law,118 and, through Penal Code Section 679.026(b),
provides that a victim has the right to receive, without cost or charge, a
complete list of the rights recognized in Section 28 of Article I of the
California Constitution.119 The various rights established by Proposition 9
117

Most notably, Proposition 8 added Section 28 to Article 1 of the
Constitution and created Penal Code Section 1191.1, which established the right of
crime victims to obtain restitution from the perpetrator.
118
CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(b)(17)(e) (2008).
119
Proposition 9 is not a standalone provision for victims’ rights. It is designed
to be a part of a cohesive framework of victims’ rights. Proposition 9 Initiative
Measure § 7 (Conflicts with Existing Law) states the following: “It is the intent of
the People of the State of California in enacting this act that if any provision in this
act conflicts with an existing provision of law which provides for greater rights of
victims of crimes, the latter provision shall apply.” CA PROP. 9 (2008). See also
CAL. PENAL CODE SECTION 13835(A)-(F) (2008) (“[T]here is a need to develop
methods to reduce the trauma and insensitive treatment that victims and witnesses
may experience in the wake of a crime, since all too often citizens who become
involved with the criminal justice system, either as victims or witnesses to crime,
are further victimized by that system. . . . It is, therefore, the intent of the
Legislature to provide services to meet the needs of both victims and witnesses of
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are constitutionally protected and enforceable in any trial or appellate
court.120
In general, Proposition 9 expanded the notification and participation
rights of victims in criminal justice proceedings previously mandated by
Proposition 8.121 Under Proposition 9, victims must be notified of all
criminal proceedings including pretrial proceedings and the transfer or
release of defendants, whereas Proposition 8 only required criminal justice
agencies to notify victims about upcoming sentencing and parole hearings.
Prosecutors are now required to take reasonable steps to confer with crime
victims about its charging decisions and developments related to the filing
of charges.122 These participatory and conferral rights are important, and
they have created controversy over whether they unduly impinge on the
prosecutor’s prerogative.123 Nevertheless, they do not, by themselves, raise
crime through the funding of local comprehensive centers for victim and witness
assistance.”).
120
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(C)(1) (2008) (“A victim, the retained attorney of a
victim, a lawful representative of the victim, or the prosecuting attorney upon
request of the victim, may enforce the above rights in any trial or appellate court
with jurisdiction over the case as a matter of right. The court shall act promptly on
such request.”).
121
See generally, Harriet Salarno, Prop. 9 Expands Crime Victim’s Rights, SF
CHRONICLE, Oct. 9, 2008, at B7; LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, HEARING
HANDOUT, PROPOSITION 9: VICTIM’S BILL OF RIGHTS ACT OF 2008: MARSY’S
LAW (Sept. 23, 2008) (presented to the Assembly and Senate Public Safety
Committees),
available
at
http://www.lao.ca.gov/LAOApp/PubDetails.aspx?id=1885 (last visited on Mar. 18,
2009).
122
CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(b)(6) (2008).
123
It is unclear whether the new conferral rights afforded to victims will
impinge on a prosecutor’s objectivity and independence. A victim’s right to
“reasonably confer” with the prosecution is somewhat ambiguous: Does it mean
that a prosecutor is simply required to ask for input from the victim? Is the
prosecutor required to do more than keep an open line of communication with a
victim? The chief concern regarding the conferral rights created under Article 1,
Section 28(b)(6) of the Constitution is that prosecutors have more nuanced
understandings of criminal proceedings and may face increasing pressure from a
victim to adopt a certain course (i.e., what charges should be in an indictment).
Even if a victim is knowledgeable about the legal and practical obligations that
shape a prosecutor’s duties and the victim understands the procedural minutia of
the criminal justice system, a victim may lack an objective outlook. Consequently,
a victim may not make prudent requests for prosecutorial action and may
unjustifiably expect more deference in opinion from a prosecutor. Although
Article 1, Section 28(b)(6) of the Constitution formalized conferral rights, a
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issues related to confidential information.
When Article 1, Section 28(b)(6) of the Constitution is read in
conjunction with Article 1, Section 28(b)(7) and Article 1, Section 28(b)(8)
of the Constitution, the victim essentially has full access to material
dispositional information about the offender.124 Proposition 9 did not
eliminate any of the pre-existing victims’ rights to access offender
information. Instead, Proposition 9 augmented many of the pre-existing
rights that afforded access. As a result, victims can obtain information about
an offender either formally (information provided directly to the victim by a
representative of a criminal justice agency) or informally (information
gained firsthand through attendance at a criminal proceeding in which the
victim elects to participate).125
Since most of the information about offenders is already available in
conventional data sharing networks, an integrated criminal justice system
would not improve the quality of victims’ rights. An integrated criminal
justice system may, however, make existing information sharing networks
more comprehensive and thereby facilitate the process of communicating
relevant information to the parties responsible for keeping victims duly
informed of an offender’s status. Another major concern about the
expanded victims’ notification and participation rights is the costs that the
various state and local agencies will bear. Providing information and
allowing victims to participate in all criminal proceedings will be costly.126

prosecutor is not thrust in a new or unfamiliar position of managing a victim’s
participation. An experienced and competent prosecutor is likely to be adept at
managing the interests and concerns of a victim, and likely conferred with victims
in the absence of Proposition 9. The prosecutor, however, may encounter
difficulties in the form of a victim now believing that a right to confer with the
prosecution means he or she has a right to act as a back-seat prosecutor (i.e.,
unofficial co-counsel).
124
CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(b)(7) (2008); id. § 28(b)(8).
125
Victims’ rights to offender information or rights to participate in criminal
proceedings are discussed in the several statutory provisions. See, e.g., CAL.
GOV’T CODE § 6254(f); CAL. PENAL CODE § 679.02(a)(2); id. § 679.02(a)(3); id. §
679.02(a)(4); id. § 679.02(a)(5); id. § 679.02(a)(6); id. § 679.02(a)(11); id. §
679.02(a)(12); id. § 679.02(a)(12)(A); id. § 679.02(a)(13); id. § 679.02(a)(14); id.
§ 680(c)(2)(C); id. § 1102.6; id. § 1191.1; id. § 1202.1(d)(1); id. § 1203.05(a)-(c);
id. § 3043(a)(1); id. § 3043(b)(1); id. § 3058.8(a); id. § 3605(a); id. § 11116.10(a);
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 656.2(a)-(c); id. § 676.5.
126
See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, HEARING HANDOUT, supra
note 122.
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B. Restrictions on the Disclosure of Information about Victims
Data contained in case management systems might contain information
about victims. After the VBR, agencies will need to ensure that
confidential information is not released to the defendant in such a way that
it exposes the victim to potential harassment. As amended by Proposition
9, the VBR now protects the victim’s right:
4. To prevent the disclosure of confidential information
or records to the defendant, the defendant’s attorney, or any
other person acting on behalf of the defendant, which could
be used to locate or harass the victim or the victim’s family
or which disclose confidential communications made in the
course of medical or counseling treatment, or which are
otherwise privileged or confidential by law.
5. To refuse an interview, deposition, or discovery
request by the defendant, the defendant's attorney, or any
other person acting on behalf of the defendant, and to set
reasonable conditions on the conduct of any such interview
to which the victim consents.127
The distinction between these two guarantees is important.
Right Four is a broad restriction on the power of government
officials to disclose information about the victim where that disclosure
meets the criteria of potential harm to the victim.
Right Five limits the duty of the victim herself to disclose
information to a criminal defendant. The significance of the latter rule is
deceptive until one sets the context. As a general matter, no victim, or any
other potential witness to a criminal case is obligated to answer any
questions posed by the defendant or the defense team—or even to law
enforcement. Rather, the obligation to provide information only arises
under some sort of court order or subpoena, as where the victim or witness
is called to testify in a preliminary examination, grand jury hearing, or
actual trial. Thus, in a sense, Right Five has a symbolic redundancy. On
the other hand, if Right Five is meant to restrict the obligation of the victim
to provide information even when summoned to testify, then it operates as
an evidentiary privilege. This question is explored in more detail below.
127

CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(b) (2008).
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In light of Right Four, state and county agencies may not release any
of the following information to the public, the defendant, the defendant’s
attorney, or to anyone else acting on behalf of the defendant:
•

The victim or the victim’s family members’ addresses, phone
numbers, email addresses, or any other information that could be
used to locate or harass the victim or victim’s family members

•

Confidential information from medical or counseling treatment
provided to the victim, including the victim’s mental health record

Before the passage of Proposition 9, defendants could request access
to a victim’s confidential information, such as mental health records or
criminal history, and the court could grant the defendant’s discovery request
if it deemed the information relevant. The 2008 amendments to the VBR
revoke the defendant’s right to obtain such mental health or criminal history
information.
Right Five enables the victim to refuse an interview or deposition
request by the defense. Should the victim decide to consent to interviews,
he may set reasonable conditions about how those interviews will be
conducted. The victim may also refuse a discovery request by the defense.
The defense cannot force the victim to turn over any documents, including
the victim’s criminal history.
In light of these discovery limitations, prosecutors face conflicting
obligations. As discussed below in Part VI, prosecutors cannot suppress
material exculpatory information (the Brady requirement). The VBR,
however, suggests that victims can refuse discovery requests, even requests
for exculpatory information. Because the VBR is part of the California’s
Constitution, it arguably trumps discovery rules in both the Penal Code and
California Supreme Court decisions. And because the VBR applies to state
court proceedings on issues of state law, the prosecutor would normally be
bound to follow the VBR over federal law. Brady requirements, however,
are elements of the United States Constitution and cannot be ignored.
Prosecutors, consequently, must disclose material exculpatory information.
The conflicts between Brady and the VBR require careful evaluation of
both discovery requests and the applicable evidence to ensure compliance,
to the extent possible, with both laws.
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V. DISCLOSURE TO PRIVATE PARTIES UNDER SUNSHINE STATUTES
This section deals with disclosure to private parties—that is, nongovernmental agencies or individuals. Such disclosure may be mandated
under “sunshine” statutes which promote access to government records,
such as the California Public Records Act (CPRA) or the federal Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA). Again, the framework used will be when the
information must be disclosed, when it may be disclosed, and when it may
not be disclosed. Generally, all public records must be disclosed under the
CPRA, which can include some criminal justice information. The majority
of this section will be devoted to a discussion of the CPRA in Part A, with a
brief discussion of federal statutes in Part B.
A. The CPRA
A key question for criminal justice officials is whether they are
required to guarantee public access to information on the ground that the
information constitutes a “public record.” The relevant legal rules on this
subject are embodied in the California Public Records Act (CPRA).128 In
passing the CPRA, the Legislature found that “access to information
concerning the conduct of the people’s business is a fundamental and
necessary right of every person in this state.”129 The law mandates
disclosure of all public records,130 except those “exempt from disclosure by
express provisions of law.”131
Thus, in applying the CPRA, the official must determine (a) whether
the information is in a public record, as defined by the CPRA; (b) whether
some doctrine preempts the CPRA and removes its public record status (for
example, the right to privacy, see below); and (c) if it remains a public
record, whether some statutory exemption in the CPRA removes it from the
requirement of public disclosure.
Officials should note the consequences of applying the CPRA: If a
record is covered and not exempt from disclosure, then obviously the
question of whether the official may disclose the information is moot,
because the official must disclose the information if asked to do so. If the
record is ultimately determined not to be a public record under the CPRA,
128

CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6250 et seq. (2009).
Id.
130
See id. § 6253(a)-(e) for guidelines on the process of accessing records,
including time limits.
131
Id. § 6253(b).
129
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other rules may determine whether the official must or may disclose it.
Officials should also note that the CPRA overlaps with the so-called
“official information privilege,” which is discussed in section A2 below. In
many instances, if information is immune to disclosure under the CPRA it
also falls within the scope of the official information privilege, and need not
be disclosed.
1. What Constitutes a Public Record?
The CPRA defines a “public record” as “any writing containing
information relating to the conduct of the public’s business prepared,
owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency regardless of physical
form or characteristics.”132 A “writing” is:
any handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostatting,
photographing, photocopying, transmitting by electronic
mail or facsimile, and every other means of recording upon
any tangible thing any form of communication or
representation, including letters, words, pictures, sounds, or
symbols, or combinations thereof, and any record thereby
created, regardless of the manner in which the record has
been stored.133
Officials should note that this definition focuses not on information
per se, but on a written recording of information. Therefore, officials
should not think of the information in the abstract, and in seeking to comply
with the CPRA, they should not consider whether the content of the record
in question might be available from some other source outside the agency’s
purview. Even if the content is available in some alternative manner, the
official’s duty is to consider whether the documentation of the information
within her agency’s database constitutes a public record or not.
The meaning of “writing,” therefore, becomes particularly
important. Because the definition is both broad and vague, it is often a
challenge to determine what constitutes a public record. Facing this
challenge, courts must reconcile “two fundamental if somewhat competing
societal concerns—prevention of secrecy in government and protection of
individual privacy.”134 Generally, courts are more inclined to find that a
contested document is a public record, presuming (subject to the
132

Id. § 6252(e).
Id. § 6252(g).
134
Black Panther Party v. Kehoe, 42 Cal. App. 3d 645, 651 (Ct. App. 1974).
133
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exemptions below) that disclosure is necessary.135 This presumption is even
stronger with regards to records in the criminal justice system. Thus, courts
have required the disclosure of the identities of anyone with a criminal
conviction working in a child day care facility, the names and employment
information of peace officers, and the highway patrol’s procedural
regulations governing the investigation of citizen complaints.136
In cases where courts have held that the documents are not public
records, there is generally a strong countervailing interest, such as the right
to privacy. In Oziel v. Superior Court, 223 Cal. App. 3d 1284 (1990), the
court held that a videotape of a warrant-based search of a psychotherapist’s
home and office was not a public record, primarily because disclosure
violated the psychotherapist’s right to privacy and right to be free of
unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment.
Technically speaking, these privacy rights are not “exemptions” under the
CPRA itself. Rather, they have been construed as “superior” doctrines that
preempt application of the CPRA, and its presumption for disclosure.137
The right to privacy, however, can be waived. In Register Division
of Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. County of Orange, 158 Cal. App. 3d 893
(1984), a court required disclosure of an inmate’s medical records after the
inmate reached a secret settlement in a lawsuit with the county. The court
emphasized that by voluntarily submitting his medical records in order to
reach a settlement, the inmate waived any expectation of privacy regarding
those records.
Similarly, a strong “private function” may militate in favor of
finding that the contested documents are not public records. A “private
function” generally means that the documents do not relate to the “public’s
business,” or are related to an activity that is “adversarial to and
independent of the state.”138 In Coronado Police Officers Association v.
135

See Vallejos v. California Highway Patrol, 89 Cal. App. 3d 781, 784 (Ct.
App. 1979) (“[T]he general policy of the PRA favors disclosure”).
136
Comm’n on Peace Officer Standards and Training v. Superior Court, 42
Cal. 4th 278 (2007); CBS Broad., Inc. v. Superior Court, 91 Cal. App. 4th 892 (Ct.
App. 2001); Cook v. Craig, 55 Cal. App. 3d 773 (Ct. App. 1976).
137
Note that the application of the state right to privacy or the Fourth
Amendment that removes the information from required CPRA disclosure does not
necessarily indicate whether the official is forbidden from disseminating the
information or if they will face liability for disclosure under state or federal law.
138
Coronado Police Officers Ass’n v. Carroll, 106 Cal. App. 4th 1001, 1006,
1007 (Ct. App. 2003).
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Carroll, 106 Cal. App. 4th 1001 (2003), the court held that a database
compiled and maintained by the public defender’s Office was not a public
record because “its core function—the provision of adequate representation
to indigent criminal defendants—was a private function rather than a public
function.”139 The court likened the actions of the public defender’s office to
the traditional functions of private defense counsel.140
2. Examples of Public Records
California courts have held that the following documents are public
records. As noted where relevant, these documents are not exempted by the
CPRA—discussed in more detail below:
a. Convictions Relating to Childcare Work
The Department of Social Services (DSS) must disclose the identity
of every individual who receives an exemption from a prior criminal
conviction to work in a licensed child day care facility. DSS must also
disclose the identity of each facility employing such individuals. The
public has “an overwhelming interest” in making sure that DSS does not
abuse its discretion in granting these exemptions.141 In comparison to the
public interest in disclosure, an individual’s privacy interests are low, both
because past convictions are a matter of public record, and because the
individual invited public scrutiny when she applied for exemption. DSS
disclosure, it should be noted, does not include a birth date or a physical
description of the individual granted an exemption.142
b. Peace Officers’ Names and Employment Information
The California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and
Training must disclose the names and current employment information of
all California peace officers. Such disclosure is permissible because the
peace officers’ names, employing agencies, and employment dates are not
139

Id. at 1006 (Contrast this with the holding in County of Santa Clara v.
Superior Court, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 374 (Ct. App. 2009), in which the county did not
even contest whether a basemap it had compiled to provide extensive information
about property parcels was a public record).
140
Coronado Police Officers Ass’n, 106 Cal. App. 4th at 1008.
141
CBS Broad., Inc., 91 Cal. App. 4th at 906.
142
Id. at 908. The court added that the $43,000 expense to the government
involved in compiling such a list was not so great as to militate against disclosure.
Id. at 909.
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confidential under the umbrella of “peace officer personnel records,” which
are otherwise protected by statute. Peace officer “employment histories,”
moreover, are only protected with regard to previous employment, not
current employment status.143
c. Highway Patrol Procedural Regulations Governing Citizen Complaints
The California Highway Patrol (CHP) is required to disclose its
procedural regulations governing the investigation of citizen complaints
against CHP personnel.144
d. Traffic Accident Reports
The California Highway Patrol is required to release written traffic
accident reports prepared and retained by the agency.145
e. Records of Settlements of Tort Claims Brought by County Jail Inmates
Each county is required to release documents related to settlements
of tort claims brought by county jail inmates. These documents include: (1)
the inmate’s medical records; (2) the sheriff's investigation report; (3) the
minutes from the settlement committee meeting, including deliberation of
the claim; (4) any rough undated notes made by risk management staff; and
(5) any remaining settlement records.146
3. Examples of Non-Public Records
California courts have determined that the following documents are
not public records:
a. Public Defender’s Office Database
A county Public Defender office is not required to provide access to
a database it compiles and maintains. The database is not a public record
because “its core function—the provision of adequate representation to
143

Comm’n on Peace Officer Standards and Training v. Superior Court, 42
Cal. 4th 278 (2007).
144
Cook v. Craig, 55 Cal. App. 3d 773 (Ct. App. 1976).
145
Vallejos v. California Highway Patrol, 89 Cal. App. 3d 781, 783 (Ct. App.
1979).
146
Register Div. of Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. County of Orange, 158 Cal.
App. 3d 893 (Ct. App. 1984).
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indigent criminal defendants—is a private function rather than a public
function.” Even if the database were a public record, it would be exempt
from disclosure under the “catch-all” exemption of the CPRA (§ 6255),
discussed in detail below. The public interest in nondisclosure, in fact,
outweighs any public interest in disclosure: the information contained in
such a database is necessary to the Public Defender’s function as counsel to
indigent criminal defendants.147
b. Videotapes of Warrant Searches
The videotape of a warrant-based search of a home and office is not
a public record, and disclosure may violate the privacy rights of the subject
of the search.148
4. Statutory Exemptions from CPRA Disclosure Requirements
There are two sections of the CPRA that allow government agencies
to refuse to disclose certain public records: §§ 6254 and 6255. Section
6254 lists dozens of highly specific exemptions for items such as
preliminary drafts or personnel files. (Agencies should consult the statute
for additional exemptions not discussed in Subpart 1, below.) Section 6255
provides a “catch-all” exemption to disclosure when “the public interest
served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest
served by disclosure of the record.” The party opposing disclosure under
the CPRA bears the burden of proving that an exemption applies.
Consequently, an agency can avoid disclosure by (1) arguing that a
document is not a public record under the general definitions discussed
above; (2) resisting disclosure by relying on a specific exemption found in §
6254; or (3) asserting that a document falls within the “catch-all” exemption
provision of § 6255. Considerable overlap exists among these three
grounds, and agencies often invoke more than one.
a. Specific Exemptions under CPRA Section 6254
Section 6254 includes a number of specially enumerated exemptions
to disclosure obligations. Only those provisions relevant to criminal justice
administration are addressed in this section. In some instances, section
6254 simply notes whole categories of information that are exempted from
147

Coronado Police Officers Ass’n v. Carroll, 106 Cal. App. 4th 1001, 1006
(Ct. App. 2003).
148
Oziel v. Superior Court, 223 Cal. App. 3d 1284 (Ct. App. 1990).
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disclosure, even if that information otherwise meets the general definition
of public records discussed above. In other instances, section 6254
recognizes that certain forms of information are public records, and
presumptively must be disclosed, but will nevertheless exempt a
subcategory of that information. Illustrative examples of the information
affected by CPRA section 6254 includes the following:
● Agencies do not have to release the following: most preliminary
drafts, notes, or memoranda;149 records pertaining to pending litigation
when the public agency is a party;150 and personnel or medical files.151
● The Attorney General, the Department of Justice, any state or local
police agency, and any other state or local agency acting for correctional or
law enforcement purposes do not have to disclose records of complaints
they have received or records of investigations they have conducted.
● Although agencies “shall disclose the names and addresses of
persons involved in, or witnesses other than confidential informants to, the
incident,” as well as the statements of parties involved in the incident
(except the statements of confidential informants), they do not have to
disclose information that “would endanger the safety of a witness or other
person involved in the investigation,” or information that “would endanger
the successful completion of the investigation or a related investigation.”
Agencies can also refuse to disclose any “portion of those investigative files
that reflects the analysis or conclusions of the investigating officer.”152
● There is a presumption that State and local law enforcement
agencies must provide public access to information about individuals who
are arrested. Law enforcement agencies, however, are exempt from such
disclosure if it “would endanger the safety of a person involved in an
investigation or would endanger the successful completion of the
investigation or a related investigation.” If this exception does not apply,
149

CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6254(a) (2009) (“Preliminary drafts, notes, or
interagency or intra-agency memoranda that are not retained by the public agency
in the ordinary course of business, if the public interest in withholding those
records clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure.”).
150
Id. § 6254(b) (“Records pertaining to pending litigation to which the public
agency is a party . . . until the pending litigation or claim has been finally
adjudicated or otherwise settled.”).
151
Id. § 6254(c) (“Personnel, medical, or similar files, the disclosure of which
would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”).
152
See id. § 6254(f).
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agencies should publicly disclose:
The full name and occupation of every individual
arrested by the agency, the individual’s physical
description including date of birth, color of eyes and hair,
sex, height and weight, the time and date of arrest, the
time and date of booking, the location of the arrest, the
factual circumstances surrounding the arrest, the amount
of bail set, the time and manner of release or the location
where the individual is currently being held, and all
charges the individual is being held upon, including any
outstanding warrants from other jurisdictions and parole
or probation holds.153
● Agencies are not required to release “criminal offender
record information” (i.e., prior arrest records).154
● Criminal justice agencies must disclose the “time, substance, and
location of all complaints or requests for assistance received by the agency”
and “the time and nature of the response.” Specifically, agencies must
disclose “the time, date, and location of the occurrence, the time and date of
the report, the name and age of the victim, the factual circumstances
surrounding the crime or incident, and a general description of any injuries,
property, or weapons involved.”155 As discussed above, the Victims’ Bill of
Rights (VBR) has superseded this provision and prohibits the disclosure of
a victim’s name and identifying information absent consent. (Note that
courts have yet to interpret the VBR, so there is great uncertainty about the
reach of its provisions. Until courts provide additional guidance about how
to implement the VBR, agencies should not release victim information as
discussed in Part IV.)
b. CPRA Section 6255: The “Catch-all” Balancing Test Exemption
Beyond the enumerated exemptions in Section 6254, the California
Public Records Act provides a “catch-all” exemption for records meeting a
general exemption standard—where “the public interest served by not
disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by

153
154

Id. § 6254(f)(1).
Younger v. Berkeley City Council 45 Cal. App. 3d 825, 832 (Ct. App.

1975).
155

CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6254(f)(2) (2009).
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disclosure of the record.”156 The burden of proof falls on the government
agency seeking to invoke this exemption and prevent disclosure.157
Disclosure is strongly favored, and the agency must “demonstrate a clear
overbalance on the side of confidentiality.”158 The inquiry is heavily caseand fact-specific.
A 2009 California appellate decision ordering Santa Clara County
to fulfill a CPRA request for geographic information system (GIS) mapping
data sheds some light on the balancing test courts use when assessing the
“catch-all” exemption.159 The county argued that public finances (the
mapping data was valuable) and security concerns weighed against
disclosure. The court disagreed, finding that the public interest in disclosure
was “neither hypothetical nor minimal,”160 as measured by “whether
disclosure would contribute significantly to public understanding of
government activities.”161 The court, moreover, thought the case could be
differentiated from situations involving individual privacy concerns, as well
as situations where “less intrusive means to obtain the information”
existed.162
In assessing the public interest against disclosure, the court found
little evidence that the government’s financial concerns were legitimate, and
noted that the CPRA did not “suggest that a records request must impose no
burden on the government agency.”163 Addressing the security concerns, the
court noted that the county had sold the data to other entities, and found that
the GIS did not primarily contain information with national-security
156

CAL. GOV’T CODE §6255(a) (2009).
New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1579, 1584 (Ct.
App. 1990).
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2006).
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2009). The court also denied the county’s claim that the request was blocked not
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Infrastructure Information (CII) Act.
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Id. at 1325.
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Id. at 1324 (quoting City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 4th
1008, 1018 (1999)).
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Id. at 1327 (citing CBS Broad., Inc. v. Superior Court, 91 Cal. App. 4th 892,
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implications.164 The CPRA’s exemptions, the court held, cannot be applied
to classify information that would otherwise be public.165 Although security
concerns could weigh heavily against disclosure, the “mere assertion of
possible endangerment does not ‘clearly outweigh’ the public interest in
access to these public records.”166
The “catch-all” exemption, nevertheless, has been used to prevent
disclosure of records in cases where an individual’s right to privacy is at
issue. For instance, a prisoner’s records, sought by the media, are not
considered public records subject to disclosure. In reaching this decision, a
California court cited the prisoner’s right to a trial free of unfair
prejudice.167
5. Legal Remedies for Invalid Non-Disclosure under the CPRA
Because the purpose of the CPRA is to ensure access to non-exempt
public records, the statute’s remedies are intended to confront wrongful
nondisclosure. These remedies are limited to injunctions or declarative
relief,168 and the award of attorney’s fees in litigation if the plaintiff
prevails.169 Individual public officials, consequently, should not fear that
they will be personally liable for damages if they erroneously refuse to
disclose information that is ultimately determined to be a non-exempt
public record.
Agencies, however, do have an affirmative burden to assist records
requesters: they must “assist the member of the public to identify records
and information that are responsive to the request or to the purpose of the
request” and “provide suggestions for overcoming any practical basis for
denying access to the records or information sought.”170 The provision sets
forth a “reasonable effort” standard and does not apply if the public agency
denies the request under one of the specific exemptions of CPRA § 6254 or
if the agency makes available an index of its records.171
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168
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6258 (2009).
169
Id. § 6259(d).
170
Id. § 6253.1(a).
171
Id. § 6253.1(d).
165

44

DATA SHARING LEGAL PRIMER

[12 Dec. 2010]

Agencies should carefully consider what portions of their records
are likely to be exempted under § 6254’s specific provisions before relying
on the “catch-all” exemption to protect data. Because a heavy burden falls
on the government in “catch-all”-exemption litigation, such cases may be
time-consuming, costly, and difficult to win. Moreover, because cost is not
a justification for withholding data under the CPRA, and because the CPRA
places affirmative obligations on agencies to assist record-seekers in their
searches, agencies designing databases should consider technologies that
will reduce the burden on employees in dealing with public-records
requests.
B. Federal Statutes: FOIA, the Privacy Act, and the Information Practices
Act
This section describes federal statutes that govern when information
must be released (and by whom). FOIA and the Privacy Act apply to
records held by the federal government—but it is included in this Primer
because federal agencies often exchange information with local agencies.
The Information Practices Act imposes limitations on exposing nonpublic
information to the public, but the relief is primarily injunctive. Each shall
be discussed in turn.
1. FOIA and the Privacy Act
The Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)172 and the Privacy Act173
allow public access to records held by the federal government. The statutes
are worth noting in this Primer because federal officials, whether or not they
are located in California, may interact with state officials on some criminal
justice matters. Nevertheless, these federal statutes have no direct
application to state officials.
Like the CPRA, the FOIA provides an exemption for “records or
information compiled for law enforcement purposes.”174 However, FOIA’s
exemption for investigatory data is much harder to claim: FOIA requires
proof that investigatory information “would interfere with enforcement,
threaten a fair trial, invade a person’s privacy, disclose confidential
information or sources, disclose investigative techniques, or endanger the

172
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life of law enforcement personnel.”175 California state officials,
consequently, have more discretion to avoid disclosure under the state law
than federal officials do under the federal law.
Distinct from FOIA, the federal Privacy Act allows individuals to
access their own federal records and to request that the record be changed if
inaccurate.176 It also places affirmative requirements on federal databases
to contain accurate and timely information.177 (These requirements do not
apply to non-federal actors, unless the inability to petition for changes to
inaccurate data rises to the level of a constitutional-rights violation.) The
head of a federal agency may exempt that agency from many Privacy Act
requirements, including those pertaining to accuracy, if the agency’s
database “performs as its principal function any activity pertaining to the
enforcement of criminal laws.”178 The U.S. Department of Justice, for
instance, chose in 2003 to exempt certain databases from accuracy
requirements, including the National Crime Information Center.179 In
exempting the databases, the federal DOJ said that the “exemption is
necessary to avoid interference with law enforcement functions and
responsibilities of the FBI . . . because in the collection of information for
law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what
information is accurate, relevant, timely and complete.”180
Remedies under the Privacy Act, in cases where records have not been
exempted, include injunctions or orders to amend the record and awards of
attorney fees and costs if the plaintiff “substantially” prevails; if the agency
acted intentionally or willfully, actual damages will also be awarded.181
Damages are often limited, however, because of the requirement that they
be actual, provable damages. For instance, the Supreme Court overturned
an award for disclosure of a plaintiff’s social security number because the
plaintiff could not prove the disclosure resulted in actual damages.182
Criminal penalties are also available against federal agency employees who
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willfully and wrongfully disclose data.183
2. The Information Practices Act
The Information Practices Act (IPA) “generally imposes limitations
on the right of governmental agencies to disclose personal information
about an individual.”184 Except for specifically enumerated exceptions,
“[n]o agency may disclose any personal information in a manner that would
link the information disclosed to the individual to whom it pertains.”185 The
IPA, therefore, operates as a specific statutory version of the right to
privacy. Violations may result in an injunction;186 damages are only
applicable when someone “other than an employee of the state or of a local
government agency acting solely in his or her official capacity” discloses
nonpublic information knowing it was maintained by a government
agency.187
The IPA is unlikely to create many difficulties for informationsharing efforts. First, the IPA permits disclosure for a legitimate purpose
and balances “the intrusion [on privacy] against the public interests to be
served.”188 The handful of cases brought under the IPA concern agencies or
individuals who disclosed information for no legitimate agency purpose.189
Second, and most important, the IPA specifically permits intra- and
inter-agency disclosure. The IPA permits intra-agency disclosure “[t]o
those officers, employees, attorneys, agents, or volunteers of the agency that
has custody of the information,” insofar as the disclosure is relevant and
necessary for official duties and is related to the purpose for which it was
acquired.190 It also permits inter-agency disclosure to a person or other
agency when it is needed for the transferee to “perform its constitutional or
statutory duties” and the use is compatible with the purpose for which it was
collected. The statute simply requires that the transferring agency maintain
183
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a record of disclosure that includes the date, nature of the disclosed
information, and purpose of the disclosure, as well as the name, title, and
business address of the person or agency to which the disclosure was
made.191
These permitted disclosures are exceptionally broad. They apply
where receipt of the information is relevant to the agency or sub-agency’s
function and therefore would clearly apply whenever a criminal justice
agency wishes to share information with another governmental agency for
purposes relevant to criminal justice.
VI. LITIGATION ISSUES IN PROSECUTION
This Part deals with issues that might come up during the
prosecution of defendants in criminal cases. There are three examples that
are considered, in sections A, B, and C respectively. The first concerns
whether reliance on inaccurate data in the issuance or execution of search
warrants might result in suppression of evidence. The second, in section B,
concerns the prosecution’s obligation under Brady to turn over exculpatory
evidence. Information sharing widens the pool of information which might
potentially exculpate defendants, and thus creates challenges for Brady
compliance. The third, in section C, concerns evidentiary privilege rules—
the complex rules concerning when an individual (or an entity) may not
disclose private information. Each will be discussed in turn.
A. Reliance on Inaccurate Data and Evidentiary Exclusion
The subject of searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment,
and the requirement of probable cause for arrest, comprises a vast body of
legal doctrine—far beyond the scope of this Primer. Nevertheless, one
issue related to searches and seizures is a very salient one for agency
officials and employees--most obviously those in law enforcement and the
judiciary--dealing with individualized data. This is the issue of the
consequences of officials’ reliance on inaccurate data when executing an
arrest or a carrying out a search. The issue arises especially when police
act under the authority of a warrant. A warrant is actually not required for
the majority of arrests and for some cases of searches, but warrants play an
important role in cases of “teamwork,” where some officials do not possess
the original source of information, but instead are “downstream” receivers
of information ultimately certified in a warrant.
191
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The bottom line is clear: police, prosecutors, and judicial officials
probably need not even fear loss of admissible evidence when their actions
rest on inaccurate data. They must, however, have a good faith,
“objectively reasonable basis” for their belief in the accuracy of that data.
Reliance on inaccurate data can threaten the legality of police
conduct under the Fourth Amendment. Arrests and searches normally must
be based on an inference from available facts that there is probable cause to
believe the person has committed a crime, or, in the case of a search, that
evidence of the crime is present in the place to be searched. Therefore, if
the police have drawn the inference of probable cause from false data,
probable cause may not exist.
Most of the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment case law bears on
one major consequence of a violation of Fourth Amendment rights—
suppression of evidence in a criminal proceeding, under the exclusionary
rule.
But the retrospective determination that the inference of probable
cause rested on mistaken information will not necessarily render the
evidence subject to the exclusionary rule. The Supreme Court confirmed
the “good faith exception” to the exclusionary rule in United States v.
Leon.192 There, a magistrate negligently issued a warrant on the basis of an
affidavit that, in retrospect, was deemed insufficient to support probable
cause. The Court held that the evidence seized under the warrant need not
be suppressed because the police reasonably relied on the magistrate’s
judgment.193 In 1995, the Court extended this doctrine in Arizona v. Evans,
to a case where the error was not the probable cause for the warrant but the
very existence of a warrant: the police had relied on a judicial database that
had failed to record the expiration of an old warrant.194
But the application of this doctrine to errors by law enforcement
itself was just recently resolved by the Supreme Court in Herring v. United
States.195 Herring involved an erroneous record of an expired warrant, but
the error was by the police agency itself. The Court held that if an officer
reasonably believes there is an outstanding arrest warrant on an individual,
but that belief turns out to be wrong because of a negligent bookkeeping
192
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error by another police employee, evidence found during the subsequent
search-incident-to-arrest need not be suppressed.196 As the Court noted, the
rationale underlying the exclusionary rule is that exclusion rule is a
prophylactic remedy intended to deter misconduct. The exclusionary rule is
not an individual right: It applies only where the “benefits of deterrence . . .
outweigh the costs.”197 The Court determined in Herring that the costs of
applying the exclusionary rule to negligent errors outweigh the benefits,
since the negligent conduct is not “sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can
meaningfully deter it.”198
If, however, police mistakes are the result of “systemic error or
reckless disregard of constitutional requirements,” resulting evidence may,
in fact, be excluded.199 Thus, to avoid suppression of evidence, police
departments should establish reliable databases and consistent
recordkeeping methods to avoid a finding of systemic error or recklessness
in maintaining a warrant system. Moreover, if any employee of the police
department “knowingly [makes] false entries to lay the groundwork for
future false arrests,” a court would surely exclude the evidence.200
Evidence gained in reliance on inaccurate information from judicial
employees is even less likely to be excluded. First, when police rely on
mistaken information in a court’s database that an arrest warrant is
outstanding, evidence resulting from the subsequent search-incident-toarrest is not subject to exclusion.201 Thus, the exclusionary rule does not
apply when a judicial employee makes a negligent error. In Arizona v.
Evans, the Court reasoned that (1) the exclusionary rule was historically
designed to deter police misconduct, not errors by clerks, judges or
magistrates; (2) there was no evidence that judicial employees were inclined
to subvert the Fourth Amendment; and (3) there was no basis for believing
that suppressing the evidence would have a significant deterrent effect on
judicial employees.202
B. The Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose Under Brady
Every lawyer should know the constitutional rule established in
196
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Brady v. Maryland, requiring prosecutors to turn over relevant
“exculpatory” information to a defendant. Exculpatory information weighs
in favor of the defendant’s innocence.203 Every California prosecutor,
similarly, should know she is subject to additional state rules and policies
governing discovery in criminal litigation. In effect, these discovery laws
constitute a special subcategory of “information sharing” rules, and they
merit discussion in this Primer.
New developments in electronic databases and information-sharing
in and among public agencies have complicated criminal discovery rules.
The developments also require prosecutors to consider the Brady doctrine in
coordination with the other rules governing criminal justice data sharing
discussed in this Primer. Prosecutors who are mindful of their obligations
to disclose exculpatory information to defendants may have augmented
responsibilities if they partake in an integrated criminal justice information
system. Put differently, Brady-type rules must be placed in a holistic picture
of the criminal justice system.
1. The Duty to Disclose
The prosecutor’s core responsibilities do not change in an electronic
data-sharing environment. Whenever criminal justice agencies enter into
data-sharing agreements that include prosecutors—and thereby integrate
themselves into what courts have termed the “prosecution team” (agencies
that aid the prosecutor in performing a prosecutorial function)—the
participating prosecutors are responsible for disclosing any material
exculpatory information to the defendant that the integrated agencies
possess, even if these agencies do not call the exculpatory information to
the prosecutor’s attention. Consequently, a prosecutor that is concerned
with minimizing his or her liability for not disclosing exculpatory
information will be reluctant to participate in an integrated criminal justice
information system.
At least three layers of rules mandate the prosecutor’s duty to
disclose:
a. Federal Due Process Requirements

203

373 U.S. 83 (1963) (“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence
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In general, defendants do not have a constitutional right to discovery
in criminal proceedings.204 In Brady v. Maryland, the United States
Supreme Court recognized that defendants have a due process right to
discover “exculpatory evidence” in a criminal case.205 It is a violation of a
defendant’s due process rights for a prosecutor to suppress exculpatory
evidence, regardless of whether the suppression is intentional or
inadvertent. In post-Brady cases, the Court has construed the term
“exculpatory” to cover a wide variety of information, including all
information that has a minimally plausible potential to aid the defense in
creating reasonable doubt of guilt.206 Even evidence that favors the
prosecutor may be “exculpatory” if timely awareness of it would help the
defense prepare to rebut it or to impeach the state’s witnesses. 207 Although
the Brady doctrine does not set down strict timing rules, prosecutors must
provide exculpatory evidence in time to give the accused a reasonable
opportunity to benefit from it at trial, and prosecutors are well-advised to
continue to disclose any such exculpatory evidence even during plea
bargain negotiations and after trial, pending appeal.208
204

Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977).
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence
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Criminal cases are invariably complicated and what constitutes material
exculpatory evidence in a specific case is based on the specific facts of the case.
But common types of material exculpatory evidence include: (1) promises of
immunity or other favorable treatment to government witnesses; (2) prior criminal
records of government witnesses; (3) prior inconsistent statements of government
witnesses regarding the defendant’s alleged criminal conduct; (4) prior perjury or
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The Court has also held that the prosecutor has an affirmative duty
to look for exculpatory evidence held by various partner law enforcement
agencies, including the police.209 The prosecutor must disclose the
exculpatory evidence to the defendant regardless of whether the defendant
made a specific discovery request for exculpatory material evidence.210
Finally, and most importantly for integrated criminal justice information
systems, the Supreme Court has held that “the individual prosecutor has a
duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the
government’s behalf in the case, including the police.”211
The Brady doctrine does not by itself impose any personal liability
on government officials for failing to comply with their discovery duties.
The constitutionally prescribed remedy, however indirect, is still powerful.
If, on appeal after conviction, the defendant can establish a failure to turn
over material exculpatory evidence, the appellate court must reverse the
conviction if there is any reasonable probability that the withheld
information would have affected the verdict—i.e., if there is any reasonable
probability that the jury (or judge, in a bench trial), informed by the
evidence in question, would have acquitted on any count of conviction.
This retrospective conception of the Brady rule might, in marginal cases,
make it hard for prosecutors to comply. In effect, the very definition of
what makes evidence material and exculpatory depends on this
retrospective view, yet as the state’s case evolves during trial itself, it may
be difficult to predict whether evidence would affect the ultimate verdict.
Nevertheless, the professional ethics codes and California state laws
counsel that prosecutors err well on the side of timely disclosure before or
during trial to avoid sanctions and possible reversal.
b. American Bar Association and California Model Rules of Professional
Conduct
Under the American Bar Association and California Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, a prosecutor must provide the defense with
exculpatory evidence during trial and mitigating evidence during
sentencing.212 A prosecutor is prohibited from suppressing any evidence

obligations under state law; see Subparts 1 and 3 of this Part.
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that he or she is legally obligated to disclose to the defense.213 A failure to
disclose exculpatory information may constitute a violation of the
California Rules of Professional Conduct214 and other ethical standards,215
and therefore lead to professional disciplinary sanctions.

c. California Statutory Requirements
In California, the prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence
mirrors the prosecutor’s obligations under Brady.216 Similar to Brady,
Penal Code Section 1054.1(e) acts as a foundation that establishes the
prosecutor’s basic discovery obligations. Various California courts have
issued opinions to demarcate a prosecutor’s disclosure obligations under
Penal Code Sections 1054 et seq. In general, the statutory requirements do
not impose a greater duty on the prosecutor to disclose favorable evidence
to the defense.217 In re Littlefield, for example, holds that the prosecution
must disclose exculpatory information when it is reasonably accessible to
the prosecution and not accessible to the defense.218 In addition, Izazaga v.
Superior Court, reaffirming the holding in United States v. Agurs, explained
that a prosecutor has a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence regardless of
whether a discovery request is made by the defendant.219
California courts have also noted that “the duty of the prosecuting
213
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attorney to disclose exculpatory evidence does not end when the trial is
over.”220 A prosecutor’s obligations to disclose material exculpatory
information spans the entire life of a criminal case. Finally, state courts
have clarified that a prosecutor is deemed to possess exculpatory evidence if
the information is actually held by an agency that has assisted the criminal
prosecution or investigation. The major consideration in this regard is
whether the agency has been “acting on the government’s behalf.”221
2. The Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Information When She
Has Access to Integrated Criminal Justice Information Systems
Wider access to criminal justice information can change the scope of the
prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory information. It can do so by
increasing the amount of information to be reviewed, leading to concerns
over how prosecutors are to be guided in what to disclose and how and
when to disclose it. Second, a tightly-integrated criminal justice
information system might expand the definition of the prosecution team
itself to include law enforcement. This might mean that, say, a local police
department might be unaware it has Brady obligations and fail to turn over
evidence. After discussing these two concerns, this section goes on to
consider possible responses to them and to discuss how information
exchange might make Brady compliance more efficient.
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a. The scope of “exculpatory” or “material” information
In the absence of a prosecutor’s willful decision to suppress obvious,
readily accessible exculpatory information, most Brady material is neither
easily identifiable nor readily attainable. Even where electronic data-sharing
makes information more accessible, the exculpatory content of that
information remains difficult to discern. In many cases, office guidelines
instruct federal and state prosecutors how to handle the discovery of Brady
material, but are not standardized or sufficiently instructive.222 As a result,
individual prosecutors wield substantial discretion in determining how to
manage their discovery obligations under Brady and Penal Code Section
1054.1(e). A prosecutor can withhold evidence if the prosecutor believes
that there is a reasonable probability that the information will not affect the
jury verdict, and this requirement does not change simply because the
formatting of information is electronic.
This “gamesmanship” problem is most evident in the scenario where
the defense does not make a specific discovery request for exculpatory
material. In these situations the prosecutor is given no outside structure
through which to determine what information would likely assist the
defense in building an effective defense. The prosecutor is not required to
give the defense everything the defense could conceivably wish to
receive,223 but she may be forced to make difficult judgment calls as to
whether evidence is helpful or material. Courts encourage prosecutors to
disclose information that may be exculpatory—and, in fact, a prosecutor is
free to share any non-privileged information—but not all prosecutors will
want to unnecessarily buttress a defense case with information that is
ultimately just “helpful” to the defense.
222

See, e.g., CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, BRADY LAW AND POLICY: VENTURA COUNTY (July 6, 2007), available
at
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/prosecutorial/expert/Ventura%20Brady%2
0outline.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2009); CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON THE FAIR
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, OFFICIAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON
PROSECUTORIAL DUTY TO DISCLOSE EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE, available at
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/prosecutorial/official/OFFICIAL%20REP
ORT%20ON%20BRADY%20COMPLIANCE.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2009).
223
In re Littlefield, 5 Cal. 4th 122, 135 (1993) (“[T]he prosecution has no
general duty to seek out, obtain, and disclose all evidence that might be beneficial
to the defense.”). See also In re Imbler, 60 Cal. 2d 554, 569 (1963) (“Although
representatives of the state may not suppress substantial material evidence, they are
under no duty to report sua sponte to the defendant all that they learn about the
case and about their witnesses.”).
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The good faith attempt to identify and disclose reasonably accessible
exculpatory material to the accused—but not to share helpful material—
may be viewed by others as a deliberate attempt to circumvent the
requirements of Brady and its progeny. What further complicates this
problem is that it is hard for a prosecutor to identify favorable information
at the outset of a trial when he or she has no idea how the issues will
actually play out at trial. As is often the case with alleged Brady violations,
evidence that a prosecutor categorizes as non-discoverable before the trial
may prove to be material evidence at later stages in the case.
In many instances, consequently, the prosecutor may simply guess
wrong whether evidence is material, while in other instances the prosecutor
might arguably be guilty of hedging against certain information getting
uncovered. Amidst these dilemmas, robust information sharing platforms
are likely to increase the frequency with which a prosecutor is forced to
make materiality determinations, as the universe of potentially exculpatory
information will certainly expand.
b. Expanding the “Prosecution Team” and the Prosecutor’s
Responsibilities
In addition to the identification issue, a separate dilemma for
prosecutors arises in an electronic data-sharing environment when more
parties are grouped as members of the prosecution team.224 Not only is the
universe of information likely to be characterized as reasonably accessible,
but the agencies possessing the information may also be characterized as
engaging in a prosecutorial function. Namely, a prosecutor that has
systematic and formal data sharing access to information compiled by local
criminal justice agencies is arguably incorporating those agencies into the
prosecution team, even if they are not instrumental to a prosecutorial or
investigative function. (Under Brady, information possessed by an agency
that has no connection to the investigation or prosecution, and is not part of
an information-sharing agreement, is not possessed by the prosecution team,
and, thus, the prosecutor does not have a duty to search for or to disclose
such material.)
In this regard, a prosecutor’s participation in a comprehensive
224

Members of the prosecution team include any federal, state, and local law
enforcement officers and other government officials participating in the
investigation and prosecution of the criminal case against the defendant. Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995).
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information sharing system may unwittingly expand the prosecutor’s
obligations to account for the information of other agencies now
incorporated into the prosecution team.225 While the prosecutor’s
disclosure obligations do not change in a formalized data-sharing
environment, the universe of readily accessible information for which the
prosecutor is liable is expanded.226 As a practical matter, the prosecutor
faces an increased risk of overlooking relevant information and exhibiting
negligence if she does not micromanage the other agencies. In all
likelihood, though, a prosecutor will demonstrate competence in seeking out
exculpatory information that is maintained in an integrated information
database.
c. An Open File Policy as a Remedy for Gamesmanship?
Prosecutors are not required to adopt an open file policy,227 but
prosecutors may increasingly elect to use an open file discovery policy in
the context of electronic data-sharing. The gamesmanship problem remains
a concern when a prosecutor adopts an open file policy because the open
file policy may be employed as a tool to subvert the prosecutor’s duty to
disclose Brady material.228 While an open file policy, in some sense, may
enhance the perception of compliance, the underlying concern is that a
prosecutor is still able to withhold information that is presented in an open
file.229
As a practical matter, an open file policy is most useful when the
information in the file is accurate and complete. Therefore, a prosecutor
who makes no effort to supplement the information in the file or to ensure
that the open file is actually representative of the information that they can
access will distort the discovery process and violate a defendant’s due

225

The prosecution’s obligations will remain the same with respect to entities
that are traditionally considered part of the prosecution team even if the latter
entities do not partake in the information sharing network.
226
See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 142 Cal. App. 4th 776 (Ct. App. 2006) (police
reports concerning impeachment evidence not in an electronic database, Criminal
Justice Information System, that defense counsel had access to and prosecutor did
not provide defense with missing police reports in violation of Brady).
227
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 (“We have never held that the Constitution demands
an open file policy.”).
228
See, e.g., People v. Zambrano, 41 Cal. 4th 1082, 1134 (2007) overruled, in
part, by People v. Doolin, 45 Cal. 4th 390, 421 (2009).
229
See, e.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004).
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process rights.230 The prosecutor would not satisfy his Brady discovery
obligations by simply relying on a participating agency to update a shared
database; the responsibility to disclose is uniquely the prosecutor’s
obligation.231 For instance, information that is in the process of being
uploaded into a database is still subject to the Brady rules.232
As a result, an open file policy does not necessarily obviate a
prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory materials not contained in the
open file; but an open file policy can effectively lessen the suspicion that a
prosecutor is withholding information. Perceptions of compliance aside, if a
prosecutor is responsible for disclosing exculpatory information held by
integrated agencies, it may be most practical for the prosecutor to provide
the defendant with access to the entire file. Some commentators express
concern that an open file policy may be used as a tactic to overwhelm the
defense with information.233 In the context of an electronic database,
however, it may be quite easy for a defense counsel to key word search
through the electronic file. In this sense, an integrated database of
information may facilitate the discovery of Brady material.

230

This problem is compounded by the fact that a defendant is unlikely to
know whether a file is complete and may actually gain a false confidence from
having access to the prosecutor’s open file regarding how to proceed at trial. In
effect, the defendant is in the same position as when the prosecutor informs the
defense that there is no exculpatory evidence. The defense has no real way to
measure how forthright the prosecutor is in representing compliance with the
discovery rules. Moreover, as the Supreme Court noted in Bagley, this type of
misrepresentation can cause detrimental reliance on the part of the defense, e.g.,
“the defense might abandon lines of independent investigation, defenses, or trial
strategies that it otherwise would have pursued.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S.
667, 682 (1985).
231
See e.g., In re Brown, 17 Cal. 4th 873 (1998) (“[T]he Supreme Court has
unambiguously assigned the duty to disclose solely and exclusively to the
prosecution; those assisting the government’s case are no more than agents. By
necessary implication, the duty is nondelegable at least to the extent the
prosecution remains responsible for any lapse in compliance. Since the prosecution
must bear the consequences of its own failure to disclose, a fortiori, it must be
charged with any negligence on the part of other agencies acting on its behalf.”).
232
Id. at 881 (“The principles Brady and its progeny embody are not
abstractions or matters of technical compliance. The sole purpose is to ensure that
the defendant has all available exculpatory evidence to mount a defense. To that
end, a document sent but not received is as useless as a document not sent at all.”).
233
Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors
Play, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531 (2007).
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Given the likelihood that criminal justice agency files are not always
in synch with a prosecutor’s file (for instance, due to delays in uploading
information), an open file policy in an integrated information database may
provide a defendant with wholly accurate and reliable information at one
point but incomplete and misrepresentative information at another. A
defense attorney will likely be aware of this pitfall, as discussed earlier, but
it is not the defense attorney’s responsibility to micromanage a prosecutor’s
discovery obligations.
d. Improved Efficiency and Quality of Information
Although an integrated information system may make some of the
gamesmanship problems more pronounced, an integrated information
system could also enable the prosecutor to more efficiently meet his or her
Brady disclosure requirements.234 Assuming a prosecutor seeks a fair
adjudicative process and demonstrates a willingness to act in good faith, an
electronic data-sharing environment can facilitate prompt compliance with
Brady and comparable discovery rules. The vast amount of information that
a prosecutor is obligated to sift through would become more easily
navigable if aligned criminal justice agencies (i.e., agencies that would
normally be considered part of the prosecution team) participate in
integrated criminal justice information sharing systems.
The effectiveness of discovery rules established by Brady and under
Penal Code Sections 1054 et seq. ultimately depends on the individual
attitudes and posture of a prosecutor. It may seem counterintuitive that a
prosecutor can more effectively manage information when there is more
information available, but the core issue is whether or not the prosecutor is
aware of the information, and an integrated criminal justice information
system can strengthen this awareness. It will be less convincing,
consequently, for a prosecutor to claim that she was ignorant of exculpatory
information within an integrated information sharing system. Hence, a
prosecutor may end up being more dutiful—and accountable—as
information-sharing increases.

234

In Kyles v. Whitley, Justice Souter captures this idea in discussing some of
the practical problems a prosecutor may face in meeting his or her Brady
obligations: “In the State’s favor it may be said that no one doubts that police
investigators sometimes fail to inform a prosecutor of all they know. But neither is
there any serious doubt that ‘procedures and regulations can be established to carry
[the prosecutor’s] burden and to insure communication of all relevant information
on each case to every lawyer who deals with it.’” 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995).
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C. Evidentiary Privileges
Many people are roughly familiar with traditional privilege rules,
such as the attorney-client privilege, the psychotherapist-patient privilege,
and the privilege between clergy and their parishioners. Privilege laws are
generally designed to protect information from disclosure in litigation or
other formal legal proceedings. Privilege, therefore, differs from
“confidentiality” laws that require (or permit) agencies to withhold certain
information from disclosure regardless of whether any formal proceeding is
involved. Most commonly, privilege laws allow an individual to refuse to
testify, or to refuse to answer certain questions when under subpoena in a
court, regulatory proceeding, legislative hearing, or grand jury.
The majority of conventional privilege laws will not affect
information-sharing among criminal justice agencies for one reason: The
most common effect of these privilege laws is to enable private parties to
withhold information from the government (or other private parties). The
common privilege laws may prevent the government from getting certain
information in the first instance, but they rarely affect the ability of agencies
to use or share that information when it has been legally obtained. On the
other hand, there are some rules that fall into the category of privileges—
especially official business privileges—that require discussion in this
Primer. In any event, a brief review of the overall nature and operation of
privilege laws supplies helpful context for information sharing
responsibilities.
1. Evidentiary Privileges
Most of the relevant privilege laws appear in the Evidence Code and
apply to both civil and criminal cases. Penal Code sections 1054.6 and
1102 are also relevant to criminal cases. Under Penal Code Section
1054.6:
Neither the defendant nor the prosecuting attorney is
required to disclose any materials or information which are
“work product,” as defined in subdivision (c) of Section
2018 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or which are privileged
pursuant to an express statutory provision, or are privileged
as provided by the Constitution of the United States.
And Penal Code 1102 states that “the rules of evidence in civil actions
are applicable also to criminal actions, except as otherwise provided in this
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code.”235
The result is that the Evidence Code’s privilege rules generally
apply in criminal cases just as they do in civil cases.236 These main
privileges are:
(1) self-incrimination237; (2) marital communications238;
(3) attorney-client239; (4) clergyman-penitent240; (5)
psychotherapist-patient241; (6) sexual assault counselorvictim242; (7) official information243; (8) newsperson’s
privilege244; (9) identity of informer245; (10) domestic
violence counselor-victim246; and (11) attorney work
product.247
Putting aside the unique nature of the privilege against selfincrimination (rooted in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution), these are
typically “communications” privileges designed to protect personal
relationships or other interests where the protection of confidentiality
outweighs the need for evidence. Privileged information, as a consequence,
is formally defined as “a confidential communication between properly
related parties and incident to the relation.”248
235

CAL. PENAL CODE § 1102 (2008). See also 4 WITKIN CAL. CRIM. LAW
CRIM PROC § 4.2 (2008).
236
The one key anomaly is that the broad physician-patient privilege applies
solely in civil cases, although psychotherapist-patient privilege (covering
physicians serving as therapists as well as well as clinical psychologists and
licensed clinical social workers) does apply in criminal cases.
237
CAL. EVID. CODE § 940 (2008).
238
Id. § 980.
239
Id. § 954.
240
Id. § 1033.
241
Id. § 1014.
242
Id. § 1035.8.
243
Id. § 1040 (2008); see also CAL. GOV’T CODE 6254(k) (2008).
244
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (2008).
245
Id. § 1041.
246
Id. § 1037.5.
247
Id. § 915(a).
248
Id. There are four elements that must be present in order for claimant to
suppress information under a privilege. A privilege may be asserted if (1) it
concerns a communication, (2) the nature of the communication is confidential; (3)
the communication occurred properly between related parties as set out in the
Evidence Code; and (4) the communication is incident to the parties’ relationship
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A privilege encompasses three rights: (1) the personal right to refuse
to disclose the privileged information; (2) the right to prevent third parties
from making disclosure; and (3) the right to prevent opposing counsel and
the judge from commenting on the exercise of a privilege.249 These
privileges typically apply in any proceeding in which testimony can be
compelled.250 But privileges also apply outside formal legal proceedings.
If a privilege permits a person to withhold information when required by a
lawful subpoena or court order, then it follows that the same party can
withhold information upon any request (formal or informal) made outside
the scope of legal proceedings.
The privilege to withhold information, nevertheless, may be waived.
If a privileged party chooses to disclose the information, then the privilege
is nullified. Moreover, some disclosures by a party may waive the privilege
even if the party did not intend to waive, or even realize she was waiving.
If an agency seeks information from a privileged party, it may seek a
deliberate and express waiver; although, by definition, it normally has no
power to compel waiver. Sometimes an agency may end up accessing
privileged information because the privileged party has unintentionally
waived. Generally, one cannot selectively waive a privilege. If a privileged
party discloses the information to some third party not covered by the
privilege (i.e., a client discloses an attorney-client communication to
someone not his lawyer and not directly associated with the lawyer), then
the privilege disappears, and another third party can likely compel
disclosure when seeking it in a formal proceeding. And, finally, a
privileged person who discloses information to a third party outside the
criminal justice system has probably waived the right to resist a formal
request from a criminal justice agency that otherwise has a legal basis for
(i.e., person is seeking psychotherapy or legal advice). In general, communication
consists of ‘both oral and written statements intended to convey meaning to the
hearer and reader.’ A communication is confidential if the holder of the privilege
intends for the information to remain private or secret and if the communication is
not made in the presence of a third party who is not present to further the interest
of the client.
249
1-10 CALIFORNIA EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS B (2008).
250
California Evidence Code Section 901 defines proceedings as “any action,
hearing, investigation, inquest, or inquiry (whether conducted by a court,
administrative agency, hearing officer, arbitrator, legislative body, or any other
person authorized by law) in which, pursuant to law, testimony can be compelled
to be given. CAL. EVID. CODE § 901 (2008).
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the request.
Thus, most privileges will operate to deny government agencies
access to covered information (absent waiver). The communication
privileges enumerated above will rarely operate to give the public agency
itself a privilege to withhold information it controls. The attorney clientprivilege, however, does also belong to government officials. An agency or
official who is a “client” of a government lawyer has the traditional
privilege with respect to confidential client-lawyer communications, as well
as the closely allied privilege for attorney “work product.” This latter
privilege is really a subset of the broader privilege category that applies to
government-held information, the so-called official business privilege, to
which we now turn.
2. Official Information Privilege as a Barrier to Information Sharing
Among Criminal Justice Agencies
The official information privilege is the only way a public entity
may refuse to disclose information that it or the legislature has deemed
confidential (e.g., California Public Records Act). Official information is
defined as “information acquired in confidence by a public employee in the
course of his or her duty and not open, or officially disclosed, to the public
prior to the time the claim of privilege is made.”251 A public entity can elect
not to disclose or share official information and prevent a third party from
disclosing official information if one of the following conditions is met:
“(1) disclosure of the information is forbidden by a federal or a California
statute or (2) disclosure is against the public interest (i.e., a court must
weigh the need for confidentiality against the need for disclosure in the
interest of justice).”252
Penal Code Sections 1040(b)(1)-(2) essentially creates two types of
official information privileges. There is an absolute privilege against
disclosure of official information (Penal Code Section 1040(b)(1)) and there
is a conditional privilege against disclosure of official information (Penal
Code Section 1040(b)(2)) that covers all information that is not privileged
under Penal Code Section 1040(b)(1). If the privilege is claimed by an
eligible public employee on behalf of the public entity and the disclosure is
prohibited by an act of Congress or by a California statute, the public entity
has an absolute privilege to refuse to disclose the official information. If the
251
252

CAL. EVID. CODE § 1040(A) (2008).
Id. § 1040(B)(1)-(2).
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privilege is claimed by an eligible public employee on behalf of the public
entity and the court determines the disclosure is against the public interest,
the public entity has a conditional privilege to refuse to disclose the official
information.253
There are two qualifications to Penal Code Sections 1040(b)(1)(2).254 Similar to qualifications and waiver rules for other types of
privileges, “official information is neither conditionally nor absolutely
privileged if it was not acquired in confidence or if it was officially
disclosed to the public prior to the time the claim of privilege was made.’255
In addition, a public entity may not claim a conditional privilege if an
employee, who is authorized to claim the privilege, already consented to
disclosure.
This privilege interacts in important ways with Chapter 2 (Criminal
Offender Record Information) of Title 3 of Part 4 of the California Penal
Code, which creates a strong foundation for integrated criminal justice
information systems and, more generally, formalized information sharing
among actors in the criminal justice system.256 Penal Code Section 13100,
in part, recognizes the need for improved access to and sharing of
information across criminal justice agencies.257 In particular, Penal Code
Section 13100(a) explains that “the criminal justice agencies in this state
require, for the performance of their official duties, accurate and reasonably
complete offender record information.”258 Penal Code 13100(e) states that
“the recording, reporting, storage, analysis, and dissemination of criminal
offender information in this state must be made more uniform and efficient,
and better controlled and coordinated.”259
Penal Code Section 13300(1) authorizes local criminal justice
253

Id.
2 WITKIN CAL. EVID. WITNESSES § 247 (2008).
255
CALIFORNIA FORMS OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE—ANNOTATED § 191.81
(2008) (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 1040(a)).
256
CAL. PENAL CODE § 11105(A)-(S) (2008).
257
Criminal justice agencies are defined under Penal Code Section 13101(a)(b) as “those agencies at all levels of government which perform as their principle
functions, activities which either: (a) relate to the apprehension, prosecution,
adjudication, incarceration, or correction of criminal offenders; or (b) relate to the
collection, storage, dissemination or usage of criminal offender record
information.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 13101(A)-(B) (2008).
258
CAL. PENAL CODE § 13100(A) (2008).
259
Id. § 13100(E).
254
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agencies to compile and share selected “local summary criminal history
information” pertaining to “the identification and criminal history of any
person, such as name, date of birth, physical description, dates of arrest,
arresting agencies and booking numbers, charges, dispositions, and similar
data about a former criminal offender.”260 A local criminal justice agency is
permitted to share local summary criminal history information with selected
parties, including public defenders and attorneys of record, district
attorneys, courts, probation officers, and the former criminal offender.261
But while Penal Code Section 13300 et seq. provides a basic
statutory foundation for information sharing among criminal justice
agencies, there are statutory limits on the information that the criminal
justice agencies are permitted to share, and which can trigger the absolute
privilege discussed above. Namely, local criminal justice agencies may only
share summary information and may not share information derived from
independent investigations or intelligence information.262 Penal Code
Section 13102, moreover, provides that criminal record information
compiled by criminal justice agencies must not include information such as
intelligence, analytical, and investigative reports or files.263
In effect, the statutory provisions that address permitted information
sharing among local criminal justice agencies suggest that the official
information privilege poses the most significant barrier to more effective
information sharing. Assuming that most criminal justice agencies have
sufficient access to summary criminal history, as limited by statute and
court decisions, and that summary criminal information is accurately
maintained, criminal justice agencies still do not have formal access to
“contemporaneous” information about offenders. Given that the official
information privilege generally prevents the disclosure of investigative files,
most criminal justice agencies would benefit from formalized access to this
information possessed by other law enforcement agencies.264
3. The Potential Impact of Official Information Privileges on Information
Sharing
Criminal justice agencies are likely to invoke their official
information privileges when they relate to "contemporary" information,
260

Id. § 13300(A)(1).
Id. § 13300(3)(B)(1)-(16).
262
Id. § 13300(A)(2).
263
Id. § 13102.
264
2 WITKIN CAL. EVID. WITNESSES § 264 (2008).
261
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information related to an ongoing investigation or pending adjudicatory
proceeding. Those agencies may prefer to self-report and share summary
information under Penal Code section 13300(1), thereby avoiding the
exposure of sensitive investigative information – a concern raised by Penal
Code section 13102 – if a defendant or third party seeks broader discovery.
In some ways, it is best to think of the official information privilege
as a type of work-product privilege (at least in the summary versus
contemporary information comparison), with Section 13300 allowing for
information that is fundamentally factual to be shared. By no means perfect,
the analogy speaks to the idea that criminal justice agencies have an interest
in keeping their investigative processes and confidential sources private, as
the privilege protects information (i.e., underlying methods and notes of
investigators) that is not included in a summary report.
The official information privilege, therefore, poses a “barrier” to
criminal justice information systems, as it undoubtedly prevents some
information from being included in an integrated database. That impact,
however, is true of all privileges. Thus, if the goal of a criminal justice
system is simply to formalize communication among criminal justice actors,
then privileges pose no real “barrier” to the effectiveness of that mission. In
this regard, formal information-sharing networks would complement the
informal networks that already exist and, at the least, give criminal justice
actors a centralized source of information.
Consequently, the real value of a criminal justice information
system rests not in its comprehensiveness, but rather in its ability to
facilitate communication and interagency coordination. As long as actors
are aware (and they likely are), that the information documented in an
information system is not entirely representative of the information that
participating criminal justice actors either have or have access to (based on
their relationship to the privilege holder), then the privileges do not interfere
with effective data sharing.
In sum, privileges don't “matter” to information sharing systems in
the sense that privileges are not new and have always posed a barrier. These
systems remain important, moreover, because they can change the regular
means of communication and coordination between agencies (i.e., formal,
searchable databases versus unconnected conversations and personal
contacts), not because they guarantee the information in their databases is
fully comprehensive.
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4. Waiver of Privileges: Consent to Disclose as a Mechanism to Facilitate
Information Sharing Between Criminal Justice Agencies
The holder of the privilege has the right to prevent another person
from disclosing privileged information. Assuming that the privilege holder
has not waived the privilege implicitly, and that an applicable exception to a
privilege does not apply, criminal justice agencies must get permission (as
third party representatives) to integrate and share that privileged
information.265
Evidence Code Section 912(a) provides that the holder of a privilege
waives a claim to a privileges if he or she has voluntarily “disclosed a
significant part of the communication or has consented to disclosure made
by anyone.”266 Section 912(a) further explains that “consent to disclosure is
manifested by any statement or other conduct of the holder of the privilege
indicating consent to the disclosure, including failure to claim the privilege
in any proceeding in which the holder has the legal standing and
opportunity to claim the privilege.”267 Some disclosures do not amount to a
waiver of the privilege if the disclosure itself is privileged (i.e., privileges
may be layered).268
What if the criminal justice agency possesses the privilege (i.e.,
official information)? In this situation, a criminal justice agency may be
reluctant to waive its privilege and participate in an information sharing
network, particularly if an unaligned party (e.g., public defenders and
general members of the public) would gain unfettered access to information.
This is particularly important given the theory that privileges cannot be
selectively waived.269 As a procedural matter, a third party criminal justice
agency that waives the privilege would no longer be considered a third
party once it participates in an integrated information system. The
information possessed by the agency would no longer be subject to a
subpoena duces tecum. Instead, the opposing counsel would simply have to
demonstrate that the holder or representative of the holder of the privilege
waived the privilege.270
265

See generally 16-191 CALIFORNIA FORMS OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE—
ANNOTATED § 191.15 (2008) (discussing waiver of privileges generally).
266
Id.
267
Id.
268
CAL. EVID. CODE § 912(D) (2008).
269
See 2 WITKIN CAL. EVID. WITNESSES § 300 (2008) (discussing agency’s
voluntary disclosure of privileged official information).
270
CAL. EVID. CODE § 912(A) (2008).
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In effect, the information would remain sensitive, but it would
technically not be confidential. A party that engages in interagency
information sharing could still protect its interest in confidentiality by filing
a motion to limit or deny the requested discovery. But the party attempting
to limit the disclosure of information would have a less compelling
argument for confidentiality since it already waived associated privileges.
Therefore, even if the party gets an in-camera review of the evidence in
question, it may ultimately be forced to the disclose information.
Another potential impediment and concern regarding waiver of
privileges by certain criminal justice agencies is that the privilege may not
be waivable. For example, government entities subject to the disclosure
requirements and exemptions of the California Public Record Act,
discussed above, may not disclose information that is prohibited by law.271
There may be an overriding state public interest in non-disclosure of certain
privileged information that prohibits local agencies from disclosing and
sharing public records that are exempt from disclosure.272
VII. LIABILITY
Law enforcement officials have expressed concern that disclosing
information, or relying on inaccurate information, might expose them to
personal liability. This section deals with departmental and individual
liability that might result from misuse of information or inaccurate
information. The bottom line is that fears of liability are overstated.
Provided that agencies follow safeguards—safeguards they are already
required to follow under CLETS guidelines—they should not be exposed to
any liability. If there are rogue employees who deliberately violate policies
or otherwise misuse information, the liability will attach to them personally.
But if agencies use data in a reasonable fashion, in the ordinary course of
business, it is unlikely that they can be sued for damages.
Before turning to specific cases, it is useful to discuss the field of tort
law and §1983 law more generally. Tort law concerns the civil wrongdoing
of one party as against another; this is generally what people mean when
they talk about suing someone for something. Torts can be intentional or
271

CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6254 (2008) (“Nothing in this section prevents an
agency from opening its records concerning the administration of the agency to
public inspection, unless disclosure is otherwise prohibited by law.”).
272
See, e.g., Younger v. Berkeley City Council, 45 Cal. App. 3d 825 (Ct. App.
1975).
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unintentional, and they can result in injunctive relief (being forced to do or
not to do something) or damages (usually money). Parties can be agencies
and organizations, and they can also be individuals. §1983 liability comes
from a federal statute prohibiting officials from violating individuals’
constitutional rights.
For tort, one primary question is who can be sued. In the work
environment, the key question is when an employer is liable for the actions
of its employee—for example, when a police department is responsible for
the actions of an individual officer. This type of liability is known as
respondeat superior liability. Generally, an employer is only responsible
for the actions of its employee when that employee is acting within the
scope of employment. If an employee is not on the clock, or not doing the
ordinary business for which he or she was hired, and/or not abiding by
company policy, then the employer is not responsible. So a police officer
on the beat would be in the scope of employment, but an out-of-uniform
police officer on vacation would not be. Many tort claims against agencies
could be resolved by this doctrine, provided the individuals were not acting
within their scope of employment.
The second thing to consider is who pays damages. Individuals are
often, as a matter of their employment contracts, indemnified against suits.
This means that, generally, individuals need not pay to defend themselves
against suits arising from their employment, nor do they need to pay
damages should they lose. Indemnification is a near universal feature of
law enforcement contracts and covers both ordinary torts and §1983 claims.
Section A of this part concerns the tort claims of defamation and
invasion of privacy, concluding that the risks of being successfully sued
under either theory is remote. Section B looks at individual suits under §
1983. Section C looks at the remote possibility that an individual might
grossly misuse information—say, selling access to a database—concluding
that in such cases it is unlikely that an agency will be held responsible for
such actions. Finally, Section D considers whether there might be
proprietary intellectual property claims made against those who use data.
A. Tort Claims for Defamation and Invasion of Privacy
The bulk of this Primer addresses a number of very specific and
highly technical rules governing disclosure of criminal justice information,
most of them arising under state and federal statutes regulating public
agencies. An equally important arena, however, are the two traditional legal
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doctrines of defamation and invasion of privacy. Perhaps the most common
worry for public officials handling personal information is the possibility of
a lawsuit under one of these grounds. A summary of the basic doctrines in
these areas, however, should provide reassurance that this concern is greatly
exaggerated. The criteria for defamation and invasion of privacy claims—
and the special immunities accorded public officials under these doctrines—
make it very unlikely that such lawsuits will be filed, and even less likely
that they will succeed.
1. Defamation
Defamation is the utterance of a false statement about an individual
that damages that person’s reputation in some material way. A statement
can only be defamatory if it is about a factually verifiable matter, not if it is
an expression of subjective opinion, however negative that opinion is. The
false factual statement must cast the individual in a bad light as understood
by established and customary moral and social standards. Defamation is
called libel if it is written or published in some printed form; it is called
slander if it is expressed orally.
A criminal justice agency can generally protect itself from
defamation claims by implementing careful policies that inhibit the
unintentional republication of data outside the agency. Moreover, if an
alleged defamer is a government official and the statement that would
otherwise qualify as defamatory is made in the course of designated duties,
the official enjoys special exemptions from personal liability.
In California, a statement made or released by a public official “in
the proper discharge of an official duty” is absolutely privileged and thus
cannot support a defamation claim, even if the statement is erroneous.273
For instance, in Kilgore v. Younger, a prosecutor erroneously included the
plaintiff’s name in a press release naming persons suspected of organized
crime activity. The Supreme Court of California held that the press release,
though improper, was within the scope of the prosecutor’s legitimate duties
and thus was privileged.274
273

CAL. CIV. CODE § 47 (2009). One test courts have used to determine whether an
allegedly defamatory statement was made in the exercise of an official function is whether
the communication “was an appropriate exercise of the discretion which an officer of that
rank must possess if the public service is to function effectively.” Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S.
564, 574-75 (1959).
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208 Cal. App. 3d 375 (Ct. App. 1989), the court determined that statements by a parole
agent, a deputy county counsel, and a policeman that allegedly defamed the plaintiff by
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A plaintiff alleging defamation against a criminal justice official can
overcome this privilege by meeting one of two tests. The first test requires
the plaintiff to show that the challenged action was not part of the official’s
designated functions. This test establishes a high hurdle, as courts construe
the term “appropriate exercise of the [official’s] discretion” broadly.275 The
second test requires the plaintiff to show that the defamatory statement was
made with “actual malice.” This would require the plaintiff to demonstrate
that the official uttered the statement with “hatred or ill will toward the
plaintiff” or that the official, lacking any reasonable grounds for belief in
the truth of the statement, uttered it in “reckless disregard” of its
falsehood.276 In the area of criminal justice information, the worst that a
plaintiff could normally allege is that an official was careless in
disseminating a falsehood; thus, in the absence of hatred or ill will, the
actual malice test is almost impossible to meet in the criminal justice
context.
Furthermore, in the very unlikely event of a viable defamation suit
against a public official, the First Amendment limits the amount of damages
the official can be required to pay.277 In earlier eras, juries were allowed to
presume that harm had occurred and make awards without specific proof of
damages. But under contemporary First Amendment law, in cases where (1)
the challenged utterance related to a matter of public concern and (2) the
alleged defamer did not know the statement was false, monetary recovery is
limited to “actual” damages—provable harm to reputation and emotional
harm.278 Because criminal justice matters are often of public concern, the
actual damages rule significantly limits the exposure of government
agencies to tort actions.
Other state law privileges overlap with and supplement this official
immunity to provide criminal justice officials even stronger protection
against defamation suits. First, allegedly defamatory statements uttered
during the course of formal litigation are absolutely privileged.279 Second,
police and correctional officers are immunized against common law tort
suits by arrested or imprisoned individuals except in narrow exceptions

stating that he had molested his daughter were privileged.
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Copp v. Paxton, 45 Cal. App. 4th 829, 841, 844 (Ct. App. 1996).
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(like vehicular torts and physical assault) that do not include defamation.280
Furthermore, federal government officials are protected against
defamation-related causes of action by the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA), a federal statute that immunizes all federal employees acting
within the scope of their employment from tort liability including
defamation.281
Finally, the most powerful statutory remedy available to individuals
suing state officials for unconstitutional actions is of no avail in defamation
suits. That statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, allows individuals to sue state or local
officials who have violated their federal (usually constitutional) rights.
Thus, an individual who claims to be the victim of an unconstitutional
search and seizure or a prisoner who alleges abusive conditions in violation
of the Eighth Amendment can sue under § 1983 (although even then,
individual officials enjoy a “qualified immunity” if their actions were based
on a reasonable, but erroneous, belief that they were lawful282). However,
there is no federal constitutional right not to be defamed; protection of
reputation is a right developed by common law tradition and enjoys no
constitutional status.283 Consequently, § 1983 is not an available remedy for
defamation claims.
2. Invasion of Privacy
In contrast to defamation, invasion of privacy involves statements that
are concededly true. Moreover, a plaintiff claiming invasion of privacy
need not allege that the statements complained of harmed his or her
reputation. In invasion of privacy actions, the alleged harm is that public
disclosure of information violated the plaintiff’s right to keep certain
intimate personal facts confidential.
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right of
privacy with respect to some aspects of a person’s private life—namely
intimate matters about marriage, family, or sexuality—that are protected
from excessive government regulation. But the federal Constitution does
not recognize a broader general right to keep private matters from public
280
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disclosure. Rather, the source of this right is in state law.
The California Constitution explicitly provides a right to privacy,284
the violation of which can be the basis for a civil lawsuit. An individual has
a cause of action for violation of this right if she can establish a legally
protected privacy interest, a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
circumstances, and conduct that constitutes a serious invasion of privacy.285
In determining whether the right has been breached, courts and juries look
to factors including the likelihood of serious harm, particularly to the
emotional sensibilities of the victim, the alleged intruder’s motives and
objectives, and the absence of countervailing interests from competing
social norms, rendering an individual’s conduct offensive. Countervailing
interests include a legitimate public interest in (1) exposing otherwise
private information or behavior and (2) prosecuting serious crimes.286 This
last factor is a significant limitation on invasion of privacy lawsuits against
criminal justice actors, since otherwise non-privileged facts contained in
criminal justice records are likely to satisfy this criterion.
On the other hand, if a criminal justice official asserts a sufficient
countervailing interest, the plaintiff gets a chance to rebut that
countervailing interest by showing there are feasible and effective
alternatives to the defendant’s conduct that have a less severe impact on the
plaintiff’s privacy interest. But even this is a high hurdle for the plaintiff:
For example, if intrusion is limited and confidential
information is carefully shielded from disclosure
except to those who have a legitimate need to know,
privacy concerns are assuaged. On the other hand, if
sensitive information is gathered and feasible
safeguards are slipshod or nonexistent, or if
defendant’s legitimate objectives can be readily
accomplished by alternative means having little or no
impact on privacy interests, the prospects of
actionable invasion of privacy is enhanced.287
Thus, a criminal justice official who can demonstrate that a privacy
intrusion was limited and that confidential information has been shielded
from disclosure other than to those who have a legitimate need to know
284
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should have little trouble defending him or herself against an invasion of
privacy claim, even if alternatives to the invasion existed.
Finally, other common law doctrines make an invasion of privacy
suit even less of a concern for public officials. First, if the information is
contained in a form that already constitutes a public record (such as facts
contained in most non-juvenile court records), then disseminating the
information more widely cannot, by definition, violate the right to
privacy.288 Statements made during the course of litigation are, as with
defamation suits, absolutely privileged and thus cannot serve as the basis
for a tort suit.289 Moreover, the privilege for discharge of official duties,
discussed earlier, also applies in privacy suits, and—as with defamation—
overcoming immunity in privacy cases requires the plaintiff to allege that
the disclosure did not fall within the broad description of an official’s duties
or that the disclosure was motivated by “actual malice.”
The bottom line for invasion of privacy claims—like that
defamation claims—is that common law doctrines leave ample room for
effective and efficient information sharing among criminal justice officials,
so long as the sharing has a legitimate criminal justice purpose.
B. Individual Liability Under § 1983
Police employees who rely on inaccurate data should not be
concerned about civil lawsuits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the statute
permitting individuals to sue for violations of federally protected rights. In
most cases, qualified immunity will protect the police officers against a
§ 1983 claim, and where the error is a result of mere negligence, no Due
Process violation will arise. Senior law enforcement officials are not likely
to face liability: respondeat superior, the doctrine allowing employers to be
held responsible for their employees’ actions, does not apply to suits
brought under § 1983. Liability may occur only where they exhibit bad
faith in the form of “deliberate indifference”—i.e., where they knew it was
certain or highly likely that they were relying on inaccurate data.
First, qualified immunity shields “government officials . . . from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
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would have known.”290 In other words, even if a government official
violates an individual’s rights, qualified immunity will shield her from
liability if she could not reasonably have known she was violating those
rights. Qualified immunity aims to protect government officials who
reasonably believe that the alleged unlawful act was lawful in light of
clearly established law and the factual information possessed at the time.291
For example, when a police officer relies on a search or arrest warrant
premised on data which, unbeknownst to him, is inaccurate (as in Herring
and Evans), he will likely be granted immunity because a reasonable officer
in his position “would not have known there was no constitutional basis
for” the arrest or search.292 Even if a police employee makes an initial
mistake in an arrest warrant database that leads to an unlawful search (as in
Herring), that employee will not be subject to § 1983 sanctions, so long as
her mistake did not intentionally lead to the arrest.293 That is, no liability
will result if, in making the negligent errors, the police officer did not intend
to violate the individual’s constitutional rights.
Second, a suspect who suffers a Fourth Amendment violation (i.e., a
search or seizure violation) as a result of a police officer’s reliance on
inaccurate data will not succeed in bringing a cause of action where the
violation was the result of mere negligence.294 If, however, a system
contains widespread errors, the violation may rise to the level of “deliberate
indifference” to the suspect’s constitutional rights, which could enable the
suspect to prevail against an individual police officer on a Due Process
claim.295 Thus, police departments should establish reliable warrant systems
to avoid potential liability stemming from a finding of “deliberate
indifference.”
Third, senior law enforcement officials cannot be held liable for
their subordinates’ constitutional violations because respondeat superior
does not apply to § 1983 actions.296 If, however, the suspect can show that
290
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an official policy or practice, or a failure to train that amounts to deliberate
indifference caused the violation, the county may be held liable.297 Note,
however, that courts typically view police departments enforcing criminal
law as arms of the state, thereby shielding the county from liability under
the state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.298 Still, the potential civil
liability and evidentiary consequences of reckless data keeping should
caution police departments to establish and maintain reliable databases.
Finally, a suspect who suffers a constitutional violation will almost
certainly fail in efforts to gain injunctive relief under § 1983. The suspect
can gain injunctive relief only if he can “establish a real and immediate
threat” that he will suffer the same constitutional violation again.299 In
Herring, for example, the petitioner would need to show that “he would
again be the subject of an arrest warrant that was later revoked but not
removed from a computer database, and that this outdated information
would again become the basis for his subsequent unconstitutional arrest.”300
This would be a nearly impossible showing to make.
The lack of a process for reporting inaccurate personal data may, in
certain circumstances, however, leave open the possibility of a lawsuit. In
particular, false public records may give rise to tort suits for constitutional
violations (e.g., under § 1983) when the claim involves more than mere
defamation or violation of privacy, and implicates another constitutional
right. Most notably, a federal appeals court allowed two parents to proceed
with a suit against Los Angeles County after they were placed on
California’s Child Abuse Central Index.301 The database was made widely
available, and no procedure existed to petition to have erroneously included
names removed from the list.302 The court found that the lack of any
recourse for erroneous records violated the Due Process guarantees of the
14th Amendment.303 The court dismissed the case against the individual
officers named in the suit because they had acted in official capacities, but
the court found that the county could be held liable and remanded the case
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for further trial.304 By contrast, a federal appeals court dismissed all § 1983
claims by a woman placed on the federal no-fly list, but it did allow some
claims to receive further hearing, including a challenge under the
Administrative Procedure Act, which allows individuals to file a lawsuit to
enjoin illegal actions by a federal agency.305
To avoid the possibility of legal liability under § 1983, agencies
should consider implementing procedures for individuals to check their
records and petition for the correction of inaccurate data. Though the
unreviewable inclusion of inaccurate data may not rise to the level of
violating an individual’s constitutional rights, inadequate procedures for
redress can help a plaintiff move from a mere right-to-privacy claim (which
will usually be dismissed because of governmental privileges) to a § 1983
claim.
C. Misuse of Information
Deliberate and gross misuse of information leads to individual
liability alone. Gross misuse will not tend to make agencies and employers
liable, simply because such actions are not reasonably foreseeable. When
harms cannot be foreseen, there is nothing an employer could have done to
prevent the harm from occurring, and thus nothing it needs to do to make
the harmed party whole.
Consider this example. In 2001, a former Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) agent was arrested after being caught selling
criminal justice data from CLETS and other national databases to private
investigators.306 The DEA agent, Emilio Calatayud, was charged with
several criminal offenses: illegally accessing law-enforcement computer
systems, wire fraud, and bribery.307 There was, however, no civil liability
in this case. In order to make a claim that the DEA was responsible, a
plaintiff would have to show that Calatayud acted according to official
policy (which he clearly didn’t), or that his supervisors knew (or should
304
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have known) that he was engaged in this behavior and they deliberately did
nothing to stop it. Absent that showing, the liability (both criminal and
civil) stops with him.
Taking a darker hypothetical, albeit one that this author has heard
several times from concerned law enforcement officials, suppose a rogue
officer took someone’s address from a proprietary database and then went
and shot them. Would the agency be liable? In a word, no. Clearly this
behavior would be outside the scope of employment. Clearly it would not
have been official policy. Clearly the behavior was illegal and would be
dealt with in the criminal justice system. It is, of course, true that anyone
can file a suit against anyone, but absent a showing that the employer knew
or should have known that this was happening (or going to happen), and
that the employer then did nothing to stop it, there is simply no way that the
claim would survive immediate dismissal. Tort liability does not extend to
everyone any time something goes wrong. It only extends to foreseeable
harms that cause damages, where someone who had a duty to prevent the
harm breached that duty. There is no duty to guard against one-in-a-million
harms that couldn’t possibly be foreseen.
D. Criminal Justice Databases and Intellectual Property
Government agencies sometimes refer to holding a “copyright” or
“ownership” in criminal justice data.308 This language evokes concepts of
intellectual property rights, but such rights do not appropriately apply to
criminal justice data. When agencies claim “ownership” and “copyright” in
data, therefore, they are most likely invoking the security and privacy
concerns discussed above, not intellectual property concerns. Agencies
308
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should not resort to intellectual property terminology as shorthand for
security concerns; doing so confuses security issues with misplaced fears
about violating intellectual property rights. Officials should be skeptical of
other agencies’ arguments for nondisclosure if those arguments are couched
in the language of property ownership.
Intellectual property law allows for the copyright protection of
original works that are independently created by an author with some
element of creativity.309 The focus of copyright law is on the form of
original expression, not on empirical facts or abstract ideas that are the
content or subject of the thing expressed. In Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Telephone Services Co., the United States Supreme Court considered
whether data compilations, such as a database, could be protected by
copyright.310 The court affirmed the principle that facts cannot be
copyrighted, because they “do not owe their origin to an act of
authorship,”311 but suggested that, “[f]actual compilations . . . may possess
the requisite originality.”312 Thus, although criminal justice facts, such as
an arrest record or court disposition, are not themselves copyrightable,
criminal justice databases that compile factual data may be copyrightable if
the compiler selects facts independently and with a “minimal degree of
creativity.”313
Even if some databases are copyrightable in theory, Congress can
choose to deny them copyright protection under statutory law. Congress
has, for example, explicitly denied copyright protection to works by the
federal government.314 With state databases, the legal situation is more
complicated. Congress has not categorically denied copyright protection to
works of state governments. Thus, if compilations of data by state
governments meet Feist’s minimal creativity requirement, they can
presumptively enjoy copyright protection. Thus, state law must be
consulted to determine where federal copyright law applies.
In the recent case of County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court of
Santa Clara County, the County asserted a copyright of its geographic
information system (GIS) basemap, refusing to grant a public records
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request to release its mapping data without an end-user restriction.315 The
court held that the California Public Records Act (CPRA) did not explicitly
provide copyright protection to public records.316 Instead, it held that enduser restrictions were “incompatible with the purpose and operation of the
CPRA.”317 In the court’s view, allowing Santa Clara “to place extrastatutory restrictions” on its records would “undercut” the CPRA’s goal to
“increase freedom of information by giving members of the public access to
information.”318 Although the county may have a copyright to its computer
software and source code, as explicitly granted by the CPRA in § 6254.9(a),
the court reemphasized the principle that for public records, “restrictions on
disclosure are narrowly construed.”319
It is highly unlikely that criminal justice databases would be found
copyrightable, although no court in California has addressed this question
directly. And while some criminal justice data (such as criminal history
information) is exempt from the CPRA public disclosure requirements
because of confidentiality and privacy concerns,320 criminal justice records
are still generally defined as public records, and their exemption from
disclosure is unlikely to change the reasoning in Santa Clara – absent
statutory authority for copyright, a state’s claim of copyright to criminal
justice data would violate the disclosure policy of the CPRA.321 Even if the
CPRA did not prohibit the state from asserting a copyright to its criminal
justice database, the databases are unlikely to possess even the low
threshold of requisite creativity established by Feist: criminal justice
databases like CLETS are mandated by statute and governed by the
regulations discussed above, so the compilation of criminal data is not made
independently or creatively.
What effect does intellectual property law have, then, on data
sharing between criminal justice agencies? The answer is probably none
whatsoever, other than protections for the database source code. Any
assertion by an agency of an intellectual property right, or “ownership,”
315

89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 374, 382 (Ct. App. 2009).
Id.
317
Id. at 399-400.
318
Id. at 400.
319
Id. at 397.
320
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6254(f) (2009).
321
County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 374, 398 (Ct.
App. 2009) (discussing CAL. EDUC. CODE § 1044 and CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 25201.11(a), which granted copyrights to the state Board of Education and
the Department of Toxic Substances Control, respectively).
316

12 Dec. 2010]

DATA SHARING LEGAL PRIMER

81

over criminal justice data would not be enforceable. Although agencies may
worry about who “owns” what data, the issue of ownership is not important
because agencies cannot enforce an intellectual property right in public
records. Instead, what is important (and what agencies are likely trying to
express by using language of “ownership”) are issues of security and
privacy related to data use and secondary dissemination.322
CONCLUSION
This Primer has aimed to clear up some common misunderstandings
about the legal regime, most notably that data sharing somehow requires
agencies to enter uncharted territory. While there are some novel issues that
data integration presents—and, as stated earlier, individuals should not rely
on this as legal advice but should, instead, consult attorneys before enacting
new policies—by and large, data integration does not lead to a significantly
larger exposure to regulatory or statutory liability. Criminal justice officials
have a number of technical and data is one tool among many, but it can help
criminal justice agencies do their jobs more accurately and more efficiently.
State and federal laws provide few obstacles towards greater data
integration among California’s state and local criminal justice agencies. Of
course, there are many organizational and technological issues to be worked
out, but provided they are, one hopes that California criminal justice
agencies will take advantage of the opportunities to do their jobs more
efficiently and effectively.

322

The agreement between A.R.R.E.S.T. and Los Angeles to share data via
COPLINK uses the term “Information Ownership,” but goes onto describe the
responsibilities each party has to maintain the data it inputs into the system. Thus,
“ownership” is not referring to intellectual property rights, but to a contractually
assigned obligation to maintain one’s own data. INTERGOVERNMENTAL
AGREEMENT BETWEEN AUTOMATIC RECORDS RETRIEVAL AND ELECTRONIC
SHARING TECHNOLOGY (A.R.R.E.S.T.) AND LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT, supra note 310, at 3.

82

DATA SHARING LEGAL PRIMER

[12 Dec. 2010]

APPENDIX: CLETS AND OTHER INFORMATION SHARING NETWORKS
“Will we have an integrated system in which everyone
who routinely works with the criminal justice system
(including law enforcement, social services, schools, courts,
prosecutors, public defenders, corrections, probation and
parole offices) has easy, cheap and quick access to accurate
and relevant information? . . . The issues now are not
technological. The issues are those of governance,
accountability, responsibility and budgets. The issue is one
of leadership.”323
Criminal justice agencies have long recognized the benefits of
integrated criminal justice information systems: more information, accessed
quickly, for efficient and effective law enforcement. 324 In 1965 the
California State Legislature enacted Government Code section 15152,325
directing the state Attorney General to establish and maintain a “statewide
telecommunications system of communication for the use of law
enforcement agencies.”326 This system, known as the California Law
Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS), has greatly expanded
since it became operational in April of 1970.327 In its first month CLETS
processed 558,000 messages, which were mostly requests for information
from paper files.328 Technological advances have made the transfer of vast
323
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amounts of data possible, and today, with more than 800,000 users
accessing 62,000 terminals statewide, CLETS receives over 2 million
messages per day.329 No longer simply accessing paper files, CLETS now
serves as the gateway to dozens of computerized databases with state,
national, and international criminal information.330
As described in the 2008 CLETS Strategic Plan, these databases
include:
•

California Criminal Justice Information Systems (CJIS): The
California DOJ maintains several unique data base applications,
such as the Automated Criminal History System, Wanted Persons
System, Stolen Vehicle System, Automated Boat System,
Automated Firearms System, Automated Property System,
Restraining Order file, Supervised Released File, the Missing and
Unidentified Persons System, Mental Health Firearms Prohibition
System, Armed Prohibitive Persons System, and the Megan’s Law.
These systems provide critical information to CLETS users in the
field.

•

Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV): CLETS also connects to
DMV, which provides drivers license, vehicle registration,
occupational licensing, parking citation and automated name index
information.

•

National Law Enforcement Telecommunications Systems
(NLETS): CLETS is linked by a direct line to the NLETS in
Phoenix, Arizona. This NLETS interface provides backbone service
into every state for criminal history information, vehicle registration
and drivers license information, hazardous material information,
aircraft registration and tracking information, snowmobile
registration information, ORION ORI information, crime
information from INTERPOL and Canada, national insurance crime
information, and administrative message traffic.

•

National Crime Information Center: CLETS is linked by a direct
line to the NCIC in Washington D.C., which provides a
computerized index of documented criminal justice information
concerning crimes and criminals of national interest. NCIC
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databases include, but are not limited to: the Wanted Persons File;
the Violent Felon File; the Foreign Fugitive File; the Missing
Persons File; the Unidentified Person File; the U.S Secret Service
File Interstate Identification Index; the Securities File; the ORI File;
the Stolen Vehicle File; License Plate File; the Boat File; the Article
File; the Gun File.
•

331

Oregon Law Enforcement Data System (LEDS): CLETS is linked
to the Oregon LEDS for drivers license, stolen vehicle and
vehicle/boat registration information, and wanted persons
information. 331
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